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Abstract
We introduce quantified interpreted systems, a semantics to reason about knowl-
edge in multi-agent systems in a first-order setting. Quantified interpreted systems
may be used to interpret a variety of first-order modal epistemic languages with
global and local terms, quantifiers, and individual and distributed knowledge oper-
ators for the agents in the system. We define first-order modal axiomatisations for
different settings, and show that they are sound and complete with respect to the
corresponding semantical classes.
The expressibility potential of the formalism is explored by analysing two MAS
scenarios: an infinite version of the muddy children problem, a typical epistemic
puzzle, and a version of the battlefield game. Furthermore, we apply the theoret-
ical results here presented to the analysis of message passing systems [17,41], and
compare the results obtained to their propositional counterparts. By doing so we
find that key known meta-theorems of the propositional case can be expressed as
validities on the corresponding class of quantified interpreted systems.
1 Introduction
Modal logics for reasoning about knowledge, or modal epistemic logics, have
been widely studied in the artificial intellegence community for several years.
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The interest in this area is directed both towards fundamental theoretical
research, covering topics such as axiomatisability, completeness, decidability,
and complexity of these formalisms [6–8], as well as to the application of
modal epistemic languages to the specification and verification of multi-agent
systems [23,55,66].
The typical epistemic language extends propositional logic by adding nmodal-
ities Ki representing the knowledge of agent i in a group A = {1, . . . , n} of
agents. The use of these formalisms as specification languages is nowadays so
mainstream as to require little justification: these are rather expressive lan-
guages, well-understood from a theoretical point of view [17,51].
For expressiveness purposes epistemic logic has been extended in several direc-
tions. In one line of research modalities for distributed and common knowledge
have been added to the basic formalism [17,18]. In another one, the epistemic
language has been enriched with temporal operators under the assumption of a
given model of time, e.g., linear or branching, discrete or continuous [32,50,72].
In yet another direction, epistemic logic has been studied at the predicate level
[39,46,53], thus allowing for richer specifications.
This paper takes inspiration from this last line of research, and is intended
to contribute to the subject of first-order epistemic logic for the specification
of multi-agent systems (MAS). Specifically, we provide first-order epistemic
languages with a computationally grounded semantics [67] given in terms of
quantified interpreted systems (QIS). We believe that QIS are a natural exten-
sion to first-order of interpreted systems, the typical semantical framework for
epistemic logics in MAS [17,55]. Further, we analyse from an epistemic per-
spective the theoretical implications of different first-order extensions: quan-
tification domains indexed to agents and to computational states, domains of
intensional obejcts, etc. One of the main results of this paper consists in show-
ing that all the semantical classes introduced are finitely axiomatisable. This is
obtained by adapting standard techniques in quantified modal logic [19,22,33]
to the epistemic frameworks here analysed. We also show that the techniques
in [18] for proving completeness of epistemic languages with distributed knowl-
edge can be extended to first-order. Finally, the formalisms presented allow to
study in a first-order setting message passing systems, a typical framework in
distributed systems [41,54], revealing that meta-theorems on message passing
systems can be expressed as validities in the corresponding class of quantified
interpreted systems.
1.1 First-order Epistemic Logic in Knowledge Representation
Although quantified modal logic (QML) has a reputation for being a source of
incompleteness [22,59], quantification is an expressive feature that has often
been considered in the literature on knowledge representation and AI. For
instance, when specifying the behaviour of MAS, quantification is so natural
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and convenient that one feels compelled to bring it explicitly into the syntax.
As it is maintained in [42]:
“the power of FOL [first-order logic] is used not so much to deal with in-
finities but to deal with incomplete knowledge.” ([42], p. 81)
Moreover, in knowledge representation the power of first-order logic is welcome
every time agents reason about:
• relational statements, as in “agent i knows that message µ was sent by agent
a to agent b”, or formally,
KiSent(a, b, µ)
• functional dependencies and identity, as in “agent i knows that message µ
is the encryption of message µ′ with key k”, or formally,
Ki(µ = enc(k, µ
′))
• infinite domains of individuals, or finite domains whose cardinality cannot
be bounded in advance: “agent i has to read any e-mail before deleting it”,
∀µ(Delete(i, µ)→ Read(i, µ))
• quantification on agents : “the child of any process knows who launched it”
∀iKchild(i)Launched(i, child(i))
Furthermore, in the context of logics for knowledge it is well known that epis-
temic modalities can be combined with quantifiers to formalise de re/de dicto
knowledge [19,33], expressing concepts not expressible at the propositional
level. For instance, agent i might know that every computation produces an
output, thus having the de dicto knowledge expressed in the following speci-
fication:
∀comp Ki ∃y Output(comp, y)
but he might not know the actual output of every computation. Therefore,
the following de re specification would not be satisfied:
∀comp ∃y Ki Output(comp, y)
However, the use of first-order modal logic in MAS specifications is sometimes
frowned upon: why should we use an undecidable language when a decid-
able one does the job reasonably well already? Is the price that quantification
brings in justified? While these objections are certainly sensible, we believe
that their strength has been increasingly weakened by recent progress in MAS
verification by model checking [21,56] and advances in the theory of QML.
In the model checking approach [9,34,49] the decision problem is tackled not
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by checking validity, but simply by considering model satisfaction. In other
words, we do not check whether a formula representing a specification is sat-
isfiable in some model, but whether it is true on the model representing all
possible evolutions of a given system. While the former problem is undecidable
for QML, the latter might be decidable at least for many interesting fragments,
further investigations being required.
In addition, recent contributions on axiomatisability [60,65] and decidability
[28,30,64] of quantified modal logic, including both positive [14,26,27,58] and
negative results [15,29,61,63] have shown that useful QML fragments are ax-
iomatisable and even decidable, raising hopes that some quantified MAS logic
may also be axiomatisable and decidable.
Our motivation for the present contribution comes from an interest in reason-
ing about multi-agent systems, whose high-level properties may usefully be
modeled by epistemic formalisms suitably extended to predicate logic. Before
turning to the formal machinery, we review the main approaches to first-order
epistemic formalisms in knowledge representation and artificial intelligence.
1.2 State of the Art
The study of epistemic logic in a first-order setting has a long and established
tradition in AI. Among the early contributions we highlight [20,25], where
some semantical and philosophical issues about identity in epistemic contexts
are explored. More recent works focus on the computational and planning
abilities of agents [42,52], where first-order epistemic logic (FOEL) is used as
a specification language for agents. In [53] a theory of action is presented,
which takes into account the knowledge prerequisites to action and the effects
of action on knowledge.
First-order logic has also been extensively applied to the deductive machinery
of knowledge bases. In [39,40] a logic of belief on a decidable form of first-
order entailment is presented, and in [44,45] these investigations are further
pursued by considering restricted forms of first-order doxastic logic. FOEL is
also briefly discussed in classic textbooks [17,51], along with its Kripke seman-
tics and some significant validities, even though there is no attempt to extend
interpreted systems to first-order, nor completeness issues are tackled. Also,
[35,36] introduces applications of FOEL to game theory, while [5,10] discusses
epistemic formalisms in the context of security protocol. In an orthogonal
dimension to the above, [24] presents an analysis of common knowledge in
multi-agent systems with infinitely many agents.
First-order epistemic logics for MAS specification are used in [69–71], where
they are studied mostly in relation to the MAPLE programming language for
agents. In [69] the quantified epistemic temporal logic QUETL is presented
in order to develop a verification methodology for multi-agent systems. First-
order logic appears as the base of a number of other agent theories, such as
4
BDI logics [57], the KQML framework [11], and the LORA framework [68],
together with modalities for mental attitudes (knowledge, belief, intention, de-
sire), as well as temporal and dynamic operators. However, most of the current
literature on agent theories have so far fallen short of a systematic analysis of
the formal machinery underlying these frameworks. Often the theoretical prop-
erties (axiomatisability, decidability, complexity) of these MAS formalisms are
not the main focus of these investigations. Indeed, certain frameworks are so
rich that it is extremely unlikely to devise any finite axiomatisation. Still,
these references are relevant for the present investigations as they are among
the few to have explicitly addressed the subject of first-order modal languages
in a MAS setting.
From a purely theoretical perspective, quantified modal logic has received
much attention with a wealth of contributions on axiomatisability [14,60,65],
decidability [15,28,64], and complexity [27,30] of fragments of QML. In [64]
the monodic fragment of quantified modal logic, where at most one free vari-
able appears in the scope of modal operators, is introduced, and decidability
of various subfragments is proved. In [28,26] similar results are obtained for
monodic fragments of first-order temporal logic, while the complexity of some
of these formalisms is analysed in [27,30]. Further, [65] provides a complete
axiomatisation of monodic first-order validities on the natural numbers. Also
the monodic fragment of FOEL has been explored. In [63] monodic fist-order
epistemic logic with common knowledge is proved to be decidable, and in
[60,61] this fragment is axiomatised.
The lines of work above constitute the theoretical and applied background
against which this research is set.
1.3 The Present Contribution
This paper extends the current state of the art in first-order epistemic logic
by introducing a family of provably complete first-order epistemic logics with
global and local terms. While the denotation of the former is rigid, i.e., it is the
same in every computational state, the latter’s depends on the state in which
these expressions are interpreted. The quantified epistemic languages here in-
troduced are non-trivial extensions of the propositional modal languages in
[19,33]. The use of flexible terms is inspired by [22], which also presents a
completeness proof for such languages. The relevance of the distinction be-
tween global and local terms has since long been recognized, see, e.g., [19,48].
From a semantical viewpoint the key contribution of the paper is the extension
of interpreted systems to first-order, obtained by endowing these structures
with quantification domains. In quantified interpreted systems we allow each
agent to reason about a possibly different set of objects. This choice is moti-
vated by the fact that, as agents are autonomous, they may be aware of only a
subset of all existing individuals, possibly different from those of other agents.
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We do not aim to provide a theory of awareness about agents’ knowledge,
but simply observe that most universally quantified statements refering to an
agent i, such as “all boxes are red”, are really universal only if i is assumed
to consider a proper subset of the domain of all possible individuals: the set
of boxes considered by i. Interpreted systems are the typical formalism for
epistemic logic in MAS [23,55], but to our knowledge there has been no at-
tempt to extend these structures to first-order, even in references such as [17]
where FOEL and interpreted systems are explicitly considered. We deem this
extension potentially of note as these structures represent a computationally
grounded semantics in the sense of [67], suitable for the definition of protocols
and programs for agents, and for the development of model checking tech-
niques.
Furthermore, provably sound and complete axiomatisations are presented for
all classes of QIS here considered. The completeness proofs make use of stan-
dard techniques in QML [12,62] suitably extended to deal with the semantical
framework of quantified interpreted systems and a richer language with local
terms, indexed quantifiers, and distributed knowledge. The completess proof
for FOEL with distributed knowledge extends to first-order the techniques
in [18]. Note that an indipendent completeness proof for these propositional
languages appeared in [31].
Finally, we apply the formal machinery to the analysis of MAS scenarios. The
muddy children puzzle and message passing systems belong to the folklore of
AI and distributed systems [17,41], but their first-order formalisations here
provided are original.
Scheme of the paper. In Section 2 we present two classes of first-order struc-
tures: systems of global states and Kripke frames, as well as several subclasses
of these. In Section 3 we introduce a group of first-order modal languages,
which are interpreted on quantified interpreted systems, a valued version of
systems of global states. In Section 4 we introduce a class of first-order modal
axiomatisations, and prove their soundness and completeness with respect to
the structures in Section 2. In Section 5 we exemplify the use of the syntax
and semantics by describing some formal models for multi-agent systems and
discuss some specification patterns. Section 6 is devoted to the analysis of
message passing systems. Finally, Section 7 presents related work and draws
some conclusions.
2 Systems of Global States and Kripke Frames
In this section we introduce systems of global states and Kripke frames in a
first-order setting. While the first ones are used in computer science to model
the behaviour of MAS [17,23,51,55], Kripke frames are typically employed to
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acquire a deeper understanding of the formal properties of these systems [6–8].
Technically, we extend the corresponding propositional structures to first-order
by considering a distinct domain of quantification for each agent. This choice
is motivated by the fact that, as agents are autonomous, they might consider
distinct domains of individuals. Then we define two maps between these classes
of structures, and prove that the composition of these maps is an isomorphism.
These results will be used for translating the completeness results from Kripke
semantics to systems of global states. In what follows we assume a set of agents
A = {1, . . . , n}.
2.1 Systems of Global States
This paper is primarily concerned with the representation of knowledge in
MAS, not their temporal evolution. Given this, we adopt the “static” per-
spective on the systems of global states [47], rather than their “dynamic”
version [17]. So, while we assume that the states of the system result from the
evolution given by protocols and transitions, we do not consider these explic-
itly. More formally, consider a set Li of local states li, l
′
i, . . ., for each agent
i ∈ A, and a set Le containing the local states of the environment le, l
′
e, . . ..
We define a system of global states as follows:
Definition 1 (Systems of Global States) A system of global states, or SGS,
is a tuple S = 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 such that S ⊆ Le × L1 × . . . × Ln
is a non-empty set of global states; D is a non-empty set of individuals, and
for i ∈ A, Di is a subset of D; F ⊆ {f | f : S → D} is a non-empty set of
functions from S to D, and for i ∈ A, Fi is a subset of F .
We denote the class of all systems of global states as SGS.
Intuitively, S is the set of possible configurations of the system corresponding
to the set of reachable states obtained by considering the temporal evolution
of the system. Given that we do not consider the temporal dimension, we
simply take S as a subset of the set of all possible states.
The domain D contains the individuals for interpreting global terms, and F is
the interpretation domain for local terms. We assign a fixed meaning to global
terms like “π” by including the corresponding real number in the domain D
of individuals. On the contrary, expressions such as “the value stored in the
register”, which identifies possibly different values a and a′ at different global
states s and s′ respectively, will be modeled as a function f ∈ F , also called
intensional object, such that f(s) = a and f(s′) = a′.
In systems of global states we have possibly different quantification domainsDi
and Fi for each agent i ∈ A. This feature is motivated by the fact that, as each
agent i is autonomous and may have only a partial view of the surrounding
environment, she could have access only to subsets Di and Fi of the domains
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D and F of individuals, possibly different from the domains Dj and Fj of
another agent j.
Note that in general Di and Fi are independent from global states, i.e., for
s, s′ ∈ S, the domains Di and Fi of agent i in s are the same as the domains Di
and Fi in s
′. This means that individuals neither appear nor disappear during
the evolution of the system. We deem this assumption consistent with the
external account of knowledge usually adopted in the framework of epistemic
logic. In this line of research knowledge is ascribed to agents by an external
observer (in our case the system specifier), rather than explicitly possessed by
them. This means that a formula like Ki∀iyφ does not express that agent i
explicitly knows that all y are φ, i.e., that ∀iyφ is the case. Instead, it suffices
that for every y, i knows that φ is the case, i.e., ∀iyKiφ. In other words, agent
i needs not to be aware of all the individuals in his domain of quantification.
In this respect the individuals in Di and Fi can be thought of as persisting in
the various global states from the viewpoint of the external observer.
In the next section we consider various classes of systems of global states.
2.2 Further Systems of Global States
We remarked that in systems of global states individuals neither appear nor
disappear. A different scenario we may wish to consider consists of quantifi-
cation domains changing at run-time. For this purpose we introduce varying
systems of global states:
Definition 2 (Varying SGS) A varying system of global states, or varying
SGS, is a tuple S = 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 such that S, D, and F are
defined as in Definition 1, and for each i ∈ A, Di is a function from S to the
power set ℘(D) = {D′ | D′ ⊆ D}, and Fi is a function from S to the power
set ℘(F ) = {F ′ | F ′ ⊆ F}.
We denote the class of all varying systems of global states as SGSvar.
In a varying SGS the domains of quantification depend not only on the agent,
but also on her computational state, that is, for s 6= s′, the quantification do-
main Di(s) (respectively Fi(s)) can possibly be different from Di(s
′) (respec-
tively Fi(s
′)). Therefore, varying SGS are useful to model systems in which
individuals might appear and disappear during the system runs.
Observe that the domains Di(s) and Fi(s) do not contribute to the definition
of the local state of agent i in a state s. This implies that there can be states
s and s′ such that li(s) = li(s
′), and yet Di(s) 6= Di(s
′) or Fi(s) 6= Fi(s
′). The
quantification domains of i depend also on the local states of the other agents.
While it is instructive to look at this general setting, it is also of interest to
consider the case where the same quantification domain is available to one
agent when she is in the same local state. Thus, we introduce regular systems
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of global states:
Definition 3 (Regular SGS) A regular system of global states, or regular
SGS, is a varying SGS such that:
for all s, s′ ∈ S, li(s) = li(s
′) implies Di(s) = Di(s
′) and Fi(s) = Fi(s
′) (1)
We denote the class of all regular systems of global states as SGSreg.
In other words, in regular SGS the quantification domains of agent i are part
of her local state.
Further, note that in a system of global states the individuals in D can be
seen as constant functions from S to D itself, i.e., for every a ∈ D consider
the function a : S → D returning a for every s ∈ S. Hence, we can take D
itself as the domain F of intensional objects, thus obtaining a peculiar class
of systems of global states:
Definition 4 (Objectual SGS) An objectual system of global states, or ob-
jectual SGS, is an SGS S = 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 such that D = F , and
for i ∈ A, Di = Fi.
We denote the class of all objectual SGS as SGSobj.
Objectual SGS, which can be seen as triples S = 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A〉, are partic-
ular instances of SGS, easier to handle and yet suitable for modeling useful
applications, as we will show in Section 5. In fact, objectual SGS are suffi-
cient for interpreting first-order epistemic languages with global terms only,
the typical formalism for quantified modal logic [19,22,33]. Thus, the present
semantical framework encompasses many of the formal accounts available in
the literature on QML.
For the present investigations it is of particular interest to explore the rela-
tionship among individuals in the various Di and Fi, for i ∈ A. In general
system of global states the domain Fi can be any set of function from S to D,
but we may find convenient to define some constraints on the functions in Fi.
In the rest of the paper we will consider the following constraints:
for all s, s′ ∈ S, li(s) = li(s
′) and f(s) ∈ Di implies f(s
′) ∈ Di (2)
for all s, s′ ∈ S, f ∈ Fi, li(s) = li(s
′) and f(s) ∈ Di implies f(s
′) ∈ Di (3)
for all s ∈ S, f ∈ Fi, f(s) ∈ Di (4)
for all s, s′ ∈ S, f ∈ Fi and li(s) = li(s
′) implies f(s) = f(s′) (5)
for all s, s′ ∈ S, f ∈ Fi and li(s) = li(s
′) implies f(s) = f(s′) ∈ Di (6)
Intuitively, formula (2) expresses the fact that if the intensional object f
chooses an existing individual at global state s, then agent i knows this fact.
Formula (3) restricts formula (2) to the intensional objects in the domain Fi,
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while formula (4) is a strenghtening of (3) urging that Fi is a set of functions
with domain S and codomain Di ⊆ D. Further, by formula (5) the functions
in Fi have as domain the set Li of agent i’s local state, while formula (6) is
the conjunction of (4) and (5), and it implies that the functions in Fi have
domain Li and codomain Di.
Given the above, we introduce five further classes of systems of global states.
Definition 5 For every k, 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, SGSk ⊆ SGS is the class of the system
of global states satisfying formula (k).
In Section 4 we will prove that the results available for the systems of global
states in SGS , notably the soundness and completeness theorems, also apply to
the other classes of SGS with minor changes. The following table summarizes
the classes of SGS we will analyse in the rest of the paper, for 2 ≤ k ≤ 6.
Systems of Global States
SGS all
SGSvar varying
SGSobj objectual
SGSreg regular
SGSk SGS in SGS satisfying formula (k)
Finally, note that we allow for the possibility that A ⊆ D. This implies that
agents can reason about themselves, their properties, and relationships: some
examples of the expressiveness possibilities of the present formalism are given
in Section 3.2.
2.3 Kripke Frames
While Kripke frames are less intuitive than interpreted systems to model MAS,
they are more convenient for the purpose of formal analysis, notably complete-
ness investigations. As customarily in epistemic logic, we work with frames
with equivalence relations ∼i, that is, for a non-empty set W ,
for every w in W , w ∼i w reflexivity
for every w, w′ in W , w ∼i w
′ implies w′ ∼i w symmetry
for every w, w′, w′′ in W ,w ∼i w
′ and w′ ∼i w
′′ implies w ∼i w
′′ transitivity
so we take the following definition:
Definition 6 (Frames) A Kripke frame, or frame, is a tuple F = 〈W,
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{∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 such that W is a non-empty set; for i ∈ A,
∼i is an equivalence relation on W ; D is a non-empty set of individuals, and
for i ∈ A, Di is a subset of D; F ⊆ {f | f : W → D} is a non-empty set of
functions from W to D, and for i ∈ A, Fi is a subset of F .
The class of all Kripke frames is denoted by K.
In the model theory of modal logic W is usually refered to as the set of possi-
ble worlds, while each ∼i is the accessibility relation between worlds [37]. The
intuitive meaning of the elements D and F in a Kripke frame is similar to that
in a system of global states: they represent the domains of interpretation for
global and local terms respectively.
In contrast with interpreted systems, Kripke frames are static structures with
no obvious relation to the temporal evolution of a system. However, given that
also our approach to QIS is static and we will focus on purely epistemic lan-
guages, the present definition of Kripke frames is adequate with our purposes
of theoretical investigations.
In the next section we consider some specializations of the notion of frame.
2.4 Further Kripke Frames
In order to investigate varying, regular and objectual SGS, we introduce vary-
ing, regular and objectual Kripke frames as follows:
Definition 7 (Varying frames) A varying frame is a tuple F = 〈W,
{∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 such that W , ∼i, D, and F are defined as
in Definition 6, and for each i ∈ A, Di is a function from W to the power set
℘(D), and Fi is a function from W to the power set ℘(F ).
We denote the class of all varying Kripke frames as Kvar.
In analogy with regular SGS we have also regular Kripke frames.
Definition 8 (Regular frames) A regular frame is a varying frame such
that:
for all w,w′ ∈W,w ∼i w
′ implies Di(w) = Di(w
′) and Fi(w) = Fi(w
′) (7)
We denote the class of all regular frames as Kreg.
We now introduce the objectual frames.
Definition 9 (Objectual frames) An objectual frame is a frame F = 〈W,
{∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 such that D = F , and for i ∈ A, Di = Fi.
We denote the class of all objectual frames as Kobj.
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Objectual frames can be seen as tuples F = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A〉.
Finally, for 2 ≤ k ≤ 6 we introduce the class Kk of Kripke frames correspond-
ing to SGSk in a sense which will be made precise in the following section.
First, consider the following constraints on Kripke frames.
for all w,w′ ∈W,w ∼i w
′ and f(w) ∈ Di implies f(w
′) ∈ Di (8)
for all w,w′ ∈W, f ∈ Fi, w ∼i w
′ and f(w) ∈ Di implies f(w
′) ∈ Di (9)
for all w ∈W, f ∈ Fi, f(w) ∈ Di (10)
for all w,w′ ∈W, f ∈ Fi and w ∼i w
′ implies f(w) = f(w′) (11)
for all w,w′ ∈W, f ∈ Fi and w ∼i w
′ implies f(w) = f(w′) ∈ Di (12)
The meaning of formulas (8)-(12) is similar to that of formulas (2)-(6).
We now introduce 5 more classes of Kripke frames.
Definition 10 For every k, 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, Kk ⊆ K is the class of the system of
global states satisfying formula (k+6).
All the classes of Kripke frames introduced so far are summarized in the
following table, for 2 ≤ k ≤ 6.
Kripke frames
K all
Kvar varying
Kobj objectual
Kreg regular
Kk frames in K satisfying formula (k+6)
We will use SGS to model concrete systems and protocols, but we rely on
Kripke frames for technical results, notably the completeness proofs.
2.5 Maps between Systems of Global States and Kripke Frames
We explore the relationship between systems of global states and Kripke
frames by means of the maps f : SGS → K and g : K → SGS. By Lemma
14 below and Theorem 41 we will show that the axiomatisation of Kripke
frames in Section 4 is sound and complete for the class of all SGS. Specifically,
Lemma 14 states that every frame F = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 is
isomorphic to f(g(F)) = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈A, D
′, {D′i}i∈A, F
′, {F ′i}i∈A〉, that is, there
are bijections between W and W ′, D and D′, F and F ′, the corresponding
Di and D
′
i, and the corresponding Fi and F
′
i . In addition, we can show that
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w ∼i w
′ iff (f ◦ g)(w) ∼′i (f ◦ g)(w
′). As a consequence, every sound and com-
plete axiomatisation of Kripke frames is also an axiomatisation of the systems
of global states.
In order to prove this result we start by introducing the map f : SGS → K.
Definition 11 Let S = 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 be a system of global states,
define f(S) as the tuple 〈S, {∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 where for i ∈ A,
each relation ∼i on S is defined by 〈le, l1, . . . , ln〉 ∼i 〈l
′
e, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n〉 iff li = l
′
i.
It is easy to check that ∼i is an equivalence relation and that f(S) is a frame.
To define the converse map g : K → SGS , let F = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A,
F, {Fi}i∈A〉 be a frame. For every equivalence relation ∼i, for w ∈W , we define
the equivalence class [w]∼i = {w
′ | w ∼i w
′} to be a local state for agent i,
and w the local state for the environment.
Definition 12 Given a frame F = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉, let
g(F) be the tuple 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A, F
′, {F ′i}i∈A〉 where S contains all the n+1-
tuples 〈w, [w]∼1, . . . , [w]∼n〉; F
′ is the set of functions f ′ such that
f ′(〈w, [w]∼1, . . . , [w]∼n〉) = f(w), for f ∈ F ; and for i ∈ A, Fi = {f
′ |
f ′(〈w, [w]∼1, . . . , [w]∼n〉) = f(w), for f ∈ Fi}.
By construction the structure g(F) is a system of global states.
We now prove that the compositions f ◦ g and g ◦ f are isomorphisms on
the respective structures. Only Lemma 14 below is actually needed to prove
completeness with respect to SGS (see Section 4), but we also present Lemma
13 to state precisely the correspondence between systems of global states and
Kripke frames. In what follows πi(〈a1, . . . , am〉) = ai, for i ≤ m.
Lemma 13 Every system of global states S is isomorphic to g(f(S)).
Proof. If S = 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 is an SGS, then g(f(S)) = 〈S
′, D,
{Di}i∈A, F
′, {F ′i}i∈A〉 is an SGS as well such that S
′ is the set of n+1-tuples
〈s, [s]∼1, . . . , [s]∼n〉, for s ∈ S. The function h(s) = 〈s, [s]∼1, . . . , [s]∼n〉 is a
bijection between S and S ′: it is one-to-one as if s, s′ ∈ S ′ and s = s′, then
in particular π1(s) = π1(s
′). It is onto as for s ∈ S ′, π1(s) ∈ S is such that
h(π1(s)) = s. Identity is trivially a bijection on D, and for f ∈ F , f
′ ∈ F ′, the
function h′ such that h′(f) = f ′ iff f(s) = f(〈s, [s]∼1, . . . , [s]∼n〉), for s ∈ S, is
a bijection between F and F ′. 2
Lemma 14 Every Kripke frame F is isomorphic to f(g(F)).
Proof. If F = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A〉 is a Kripke frame, then
f(g(F)) = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F
′, {F ′i}i∈A〉 is such that W
′ is the set of
n+1-tuples 〈w, [w]∼1, . . . , [w]∼n〉, for w ∈ W . The function h(w) = 〈w, [w]∼1,
. . . , [w]∼n〉 is a bijection between W and W
′: it is one-to-one as if w,w′ ∈W ′
and w = w′, then in particular π1(w) = π1(w
′). It is onto as for w ∈ W ′,
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π1(w) ∈ W is such that h(π1(w)) = w. Also in this case the identity on D
is a bijection, and for f ∈ F , f ′ ∈ F ′, the function h′ such that h′(f) =
f ′ iff f(w) = f(〈w, [w]∼1, . . . , [w]∼n〉), for w ∈ W , is a bijection between
F and F ′. Moreover, w ∼i w
′ iff [w]∼i = [w
′]∼i iff 〈w, [w]∼1, . . . , [w]∼n〉 ∼
′
i
〈w′, [w′]∼1 , . . . , [w
′]∼n〉. 2
By Lemma 14 and Theorem 41 we will show that the axiomatisation of Kripke
frames presented in Section 4 is adequate also for the systems of global states.
2.6 Further Maps
It is straightforward to extend the maps f and g to deal also with the other
classes of SGS and Kripke frames. As regards varying SGS and frames, define
map f var : SGSvar → Kvar as f , and define map gvar : Kvar → SGSvar to
be the same as g except that for s = 〈w, [w]∼1, . . . , [w]∼n〉 ∈ g
var(F), D′i(s) is
defined as Di(w) and F
′
i (s) is defined as {f
′ | f ′(s′) = f(w′), for f ∈ Fi(w),
w′ = π1(s
′)}.
We state the following isomorphism result, the proof follows those in Lem-
mas 13 and 14 with little modifications.
Corollary 15 Every varying SGS S is isomorphic to gvar(f var(S)).
Every varying frame F is isomorphic to f var(gvar(F)).
Further, it can be shown that f var(S) is a regular frame, whenever S is a
regular SGS. Also, gvar(F) is a regular SGS, whenever F is a regular frame.
Therefore, we have the following:
Corollary 16 Every regular SGS S is isomorphic to gvar(f var(S)).
Every regular frame F is isomorphic to f var(gvar(F)).
The map f obj : SGSobj → Kobj from objectual systems of global states to
Kripke frames is defined as the restriction of f to 〈S,D, {Di}i∈A〉; while the
map gobj : Kobj → SGSobj is similarly defined as the restrictions of g to
〈W, {∼i}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A〉. By considerations similar to those for Lemmas 13
and 14 it is easy to show the following:
Corollary 17 Every objectual SGS S is isomorphic to gobj(f obj(S)).
Every objectual frame F is isomorphic to f obj(gobj(F)).
Finally, for 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, we can show that the frame f(S) satisfies the formula
(k+6) whenever S satisfies (k). Also, the SGS g(F) satisfies the formula (k)
whenever F satisfies (k+6). Therefore, the following holds:
Corollary 18 Let 2 ≤ k ≤ 6. Every SGS S ∈ SGSk is isomorphic to
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g(f(S)).
Every frame F ∈ Kk is isomorphic to f(g(F)).
In the following table we summarize the correspondences between systems of
global states and Kripke frames, for 2 ≤ k ≤ 6.
Systems of Global States Kripke Frames
SGS K
SGSvar Kvar
SGSobj Kobj
SGSreg Kreg
SGSk Kk
In Section 4, Corollaries 15-18 will be used for proving completeness with
respect to all classes of systems of global states, once obtained completeness
for the corresponding class of Kripke frames.
3 Syntax and Semantics
In this section we introduce a family of first-order epistemic languages con-
taining local and global terms, quantifiers, epistemic operators, as well as the
identity symbol. These languages are interpreted on models based on Kripke
frames. Finally, we present quantified interpreted systems, a valued version of
the systems of global states.
3.1 Syntax
The first-order epistemic language Ln contains global variables x1, x2, . . ., local
variables z1, z2, . . ., global constants c1, c2, . . ., and local constants d1, d2, . . ..
Moreover, we have n+1-ary function symbols fn+11 , f
n+1
2 , . . ., and n-ary pred-
icative constants P n1 , P
n
2 , . . ., for n ∈ N, the identity symbol =, the boolean
connectives ¬ and →, and for every i ∈ A, the indexed quantifier ∀i, the
epistemic operator Ki, and the unary predicative constant Admi.
Definition 19 (Ln) Terms and formulas in Ln are defined as follows:
t ::= x | z | c | d | fk(t1, . . . , tk)
φ ::=P k(t1, . . . , tk) | t = t
′ | Admi(t) | ¬φ | φ→ φ
′ | Kiφ | ∀ixφ | ∀izφ
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The operator Ki, for i ∈ A, is the standard epistemic modality [17]. The
formula Kiφ intuitively means that “agent i knows that φ is the case”. The
formula ∀ixφ (respectively ∀izφ) states that “φ is the case for all individuals
in Di” (respectively Fi); whereas Admi(t) means that the individual denoted
by term t is among the admissible individuals considered by agent i, that is,
the individuals in Di and Fi. The symbols ⊥, ∧, ∨, ↔, ∃i are defined from
the other logical constants as standard, while metavariables y, y′, . . . refer to
the (local and global) variables in Ln.
A global term s is defined as:
s ::= x | c | fk(s1, . . . , sk)
A term not complying with the above is said to be local. The metavariables
s, s′, . . . and u, u′, . . . refer to global and local terms respectively; while v, v′, . . .
and r, r′, . . . refer to closed global and local terms, where no variable appears.
The symbol “s” may represent either a state or a global term, the context will
disambiguate.
Moreover, t[~y] (resp. φ[~y]) means that ~y = y1, . . . , yn are all the (local and
global) free variables in t (resp. φ); while t[~y/~t] (resp. φ[~y/~t]) denotes the term
(resp. formula) obtained by substituting simultaneously some, possibly all, the
free occurrences of y1, . . . , yn in t (resp. φ) with t1, . . . , tn, renaming bounded
variables if necessary. We assume that local variables are to be substituted by
local terms only, the same holds for global variables and terms.
We write GV ar, LV ar, GCon and LCon to denote the sets of global and local
variables, and the sets of global and local constants in Ln respectively.
In this paper we consider two further languages, Lobjn and L
D
n , for describing
the objectual structures introduced in Section 2.
Definition 20 (Lobjn ) The language L
obj
n is the restriction of Ln to global
terms. Terms and formulas in Lobjn are defined as follows:
t ::= x | c | fk(t1, . . . , tk)
φ ::=P k(t1, . . . , tk) | t = t
′ | Admi(t) | ¬φ | φ→ φ
′ | Kiφ | ∀ixφ
Definition 21 (LDn ) The language L
D
n extends L
obj
n by adding the distributed
knowledge operator DG, for every non-empty subset G of A. Terms and for-
mulas in LDn are defined as follows:
t ::= x | c | fk(t1, . . . , tk)
φ ::=P k(t1, . . . , tk) | t = t
′ | Admi(t) | ¬φ | φ→ φ
′ | Kiφ | DGφ | ∀ixφ
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The formula DGφ intuitively means that “φ is distributed knowledge among
the agents in the subset G of A” (see [18] for details). We will show that
the language Lobjn is expressive enough for the specification of objectual SGS,
while LDn is useful for the application to distributed systems in Section 5. The
notions defined in this subsection for language Ln can be extended to L
D
n and
Lobjn with the obvious changes. In this paper we do not consider extensions to
common knowledge.
3.2 Expressiveness
This section provides some examples of the expressiveness of the first-order
epistemic languages introduced in Section 3.1. First of all, in Ln we can express
the agents’ knowledge regarding properties and relationships among individ-
uals. For instance, consider the following specifications:
(1) Agent i knows that for every process x, agent j knows that there exists
a precondition x′ considered by i, which has to be fulfilled in order for x
to be executed.
(2) Agent i knows that among the inputs considered by agent j there exists
an x for which agent j does not know that every computation x′ on input
x fails.
(3) Every successful transmission x returns a code z, but agent i does not
know this code (maybe because the return code is encrypted).
These statements can be intuitively formalised as follows:
(1) Ki∀ix(Process(x)→ Kj∃ix
′(Precond(x′) ∧ (Executed(x)→ Fulfil(x′))))
(2) Ki∃jx(Input(x) ∧ ¬Kj∀jx
′(Comp(x′)→ Fails(x, x′)))
(3) ∀ix∃iz(z = return-code(x) ∧ ¬Ki(z = return-code(x))
We note the rich expressiveness of the language obtained by combining epis-
temic modalities with quantifiers, and the interplay between local and global
terms in the third specification (but see also Section 5.1 below).
Also, observe that in this framework we can model the knowledge agents have
about themselves, as pointed out in the introduction. In addition, and not
discussed above, we obviously retain all the expressive power of propositional
epistemic logic.
Further, in the framework of first-order epistemic logic we can express the de
re/de dicto distinction, i.e., the difference between knowing of something as
being so-and-so, and knowing that something is so-and-so. For instance, when
we use an informal specification to say that,
as far as the security controller is concerned, every user is authorised to
access the site,
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one could interpret this (hence implement it!) as either de dicto, i.e., descrip-
tively:
(1) the security controller knows that every user is authorised to access the site,
or de re, i.e., prescriptively:
(2) for every user, the security controller knows that he is authorised to access
the site.
These two readings express different concepts. While these cannot be easily
separated by means of a propositional language, in Ln this is promptly done
as follows:
(1) KSecCon∀SecConx(Authorised(x)→ Access(x))
(2) ∀SecConx(Authorised(x)→ KSecConAccess(x))
The difference in meaning between the two specifications is clear. For instance,
the security controller not granting access to an authorised user a is a violation
of (2), but not of (1), if he does not regard a as an authorised user.
3.3 Kripke Models and Quantified Interpreted Systems
We now proceed to interpret our first-order epistemic languages on the classes
of Kripke frames defined in Section 2. Then we introduce quantified interpreted
systems, a valued version of the systems of global states.
Definition 22 (Kripke model) A Kripke model based on a frame F , or
model, is a pair M = 〈F , I〉 where the interpretation I is such that:
• if c is a global constant, then I(c) ∈ D;
• if d is a local constant, then I(d) ∈ F ;
• if fk is a k-ary function symbol, then I(fk) is a k-ary function from F k to
F such that for ~g ∈ F k, we have (I(fk)(~g))(w) = I(fk)(g1(w), . . . , gk(w));
• for w ∈ W , I(P k, w) is a k-ary relation on D, I(Admi, w) = Di ∪ Fi, and
I(=, w) is the equality relation on D.
In a Kripke model global constants are interpreted rigidly, while local constants
are not, so it can be the case that I(d)(w) is different from I(d)(w′), for w 6= w′.
In particular, it can be the case that I(d)(w) ∈ Di but I(d)(w
′) /∈ Di. This case
models the scenario in which agent i does not know whether the denotation
of term d is among the individuals in her domain of quantification. Shortly we
will see how to deal with this situation.
Each I(fk) is a function from F k to F , but if the arguments are constant
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functions, i.e., elements in D, then I(fk) is a function from Dk to D. The
condition on I(fk) guarantees that identical terms can be substituted, that
is, if the denotations of terms t′ and t′′ are identical, then the denotation of
substitued term t[y/t′] is identical to t[y/t′′].
Finally, we remark that Admi is an intensional predicate, i.e., its interpretation
is Di ∪ Fi, not just a subset of D; this is because we consider domains of
intensional objects as well as domains of individuals.
We will consider also varying, regular, and objectual models, based on varying,
regular, and objectual frames.
Now let σ be an assignment, i.e., any function from GV ar to D and from
LV ar to F .
Definition 23 (Valuation) The valuation Iσ(t, w) ∈ D of a term t at a
world w is inductively defined as follows:
Iσ(x, w) = Iσ(x) = σ(x)
Iσ(z, w) = Iσ(z)(w) = σ(z)(w)
Iσ(c, w) = Iσ(c) = I(c)
Iσ(d, w) = Iσ(d)(w) = I(d)(w)
Iσ(fk(t1, . . . , tk), w) = I(f
k)(Iσ(t1, w), . . . , I
σ(tk, w))
= (I(fk)(Iσ(t1), . . . , I
σ(tk)))(w), by the constraint on I(f
k)
The definition of Iσ(t) ∈ D ∪ F can be derived from Definition 23. Note that
if t is a global term, then Iσ(t) = Iσ(t, w), for every w ∈ W . On the other
hand, if t is a local term, then Iσ(t) is an intensional object belonging to F .
The valuation of terms in Lobjn is restricted to global terms.
The variant σ
(
x
a
)
of an assignment σ assigns a ∈ D to x ∈ GV ar and coincides
with σ on all the other variables; the variant σ
(
z
f
)
for f ∈ F , z ∈ LV ar is
similarly defined.
Definition 24 (Satisfaction) The satisfaction relation |= for φ ∈ Ln, w ∈
W , and an assignment σ is inductively defined as follows:
(Mσ, w) |= P k(t1, . . . , tk) iff 〈I
σ(t1, w), . . . , I
σ(tk, w)〉 ∈ I(P
k, w)
(Mσ, w) |= t = t′ iff Iσ(t, w) = Iσ(t′, w)
(Mσ, w) |= Admi(t) iff I
σ(t) ∈ Di ∪ Fi
(Mσ, w) |= ¬ψ iff (Mσ, w) 6|= ψ
(Mσ, w) |= ψ → ψ′ iff (Mσ, w) 6|= ψ or (Mσ, w) |= ψ′
(Mσ, w) |= Kiψ iff for all w
′ ∈W , w ∼i w
′ implies (Mσ, w′) |= ψ
(Mσ, w) |= ∀ixψ iff for all a ∈ Di, (M
σ(xa), w) |= ψ
(Mσ, w) |= ∀izψ iff for all f ∈ Fi, (M
σ(zf), w) |= ψ
The truth conditions for formulas containing ⊥,∧, ∨, ↔, ∃i can be defined
from those above. The formula Admi(t) means that the individual I
σ(t) ∈
Di ∪ Fi is among those admissible for agent i. In particular, if t is a global
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term then Iσ(t) = Iσ(t, w) ∈ Di. On the other hand, if t is a local term then
Iσ(t) is an intensional object in Fi.
If we consider varying models, the definition of satisfaction is as above but for
the following clauses:
Definition 25 The satisfaction relation |= for φ ∈ Ln, w ∈ W , and an as-
signment σ is inductively defined as follows:
(Mσ, w) |= Admi(t) iff I
σ(t) ∈ Di(w) ∪ Fi(w)
(Mσ, w) |= ∀ixψ iff for all a ∈ Di(w), (M
σ(xa), w) |= ψ
(Mσ, w) |= ∀izψ iff for all f ∈ Fi(w), (M
σ(zf), w) |= ψ
The meaning of a formula φ ∈ Lobjn in an objectual model M is defined by
restricting Definition 24 to global terms. Further, the truth conditions for
DGφ ∈ L
D
n in objectual models are specified as follows:
(Mσ, w) |= DGψ iff for w
′ ∈ W , (w,w′) ∈
⋂
i∈G ∼i implies (M
σ, w′) |= ψ
As customary, we say that a formula φ is true at a world w iff it is satisfied at
w by every assignment σ; φ is valid on a model M iff it is true at every world
in M; φ is valid on a frame F iff it is valid on every model based on F ; φ is
valid on a class C of frames iff it is valid on every frame in C.
Let ∆ be a set of formulas, M is a model for ∆, orM |= ∆, iff every formula
in ∆ is valid on M, and F is a frame for ∆, or F |= ∆, iff every model based
on F is a model for ∆. A frame F for ∆ will also be called ∆-frame, by ∆-K
we denote the class of ∆-frames.
We have now the formal machinery to introduce quantified interpreted systems
as follows.
Definition 26 (Quantified Interpreted Systems) Given an SGS S, a
quantified interpreted systems (QIS) is a pair P = 〈S, I〉 such that I is an
interpretation of Ln in f(S).
The notions of satisfaction, truth and validity on QIS can be defined as above.
Let Pf = 〈f(S), I〉 be the Kripke model associated with the quantified inter-
preted system P = 〈S, I〉, then
(Pσ, s) |= φ iff (Pσf , s) |= φ
In particular, we can show that the truth conditions for epistemic modalities
in interpreted systems are preserved, that is, the definition above via Kripke
models boils down to the usual truth conditions in interpreted systems:
(Pσ, s) |= Kiψ iff for s
′ ∈ S, li(s) = li(s
′) implies (Pσ, s′) |= ψ
(Pσ, s) |= DGψ iff for s
′ ∈ S, if for all i ∈ G, li(s) = li(s
′), then (Pσ, s′) |= ψ
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We say that a formula φ ∈ Ln is valid on a quantified interpreted systems P
iff φ is valid on Pf .
Definition 26 applies also to the other classes of SGS.
Definition 27 (varying QIS) Given a varying SGS S, a varying QIS is
a pair P = 〈S, I〉 such that I is an interpretation of Ln in f
var(S).
(regular QIS) Given a regular SGS S, a regular QIS is a pair P = 〈S, I〉
such that I is an interpretation of Ln in f
var(S).
(objectual QIS) Given an objectual SGS S, an objectual QIS is a pair
P = 〈S, I〉 such that I is an interpretation of Lobjn in f
obj(S).
(QISk) Let 2 ≤ k ≤ 6. Given an SGS S ∈ SGSk, a QISk is a pair
P = 〈S, I〉 such that I is an interpretation of Ln in f(S).
Quantified interpreted systems will be used in Sections 5 and 6 to model
various instances of multi-agent systems. But first we discuss some important
validities in these structures.
3.4 Validities
In Section 2 we remarked that in systems of global states the domains of
quantification Di and Fi are independent from global states. Therefore, both
the Barcan formula and its converse [19] are valid in their indexed form on
the class of all SGS:
SGS |= ∀iyKjφ→ Kj∀iyφ BFi−j
SGS |= Kj∀iyφ→ ∀iyKjφ CBFi−j
These validities state that each agent knows which are the individuals she and
the other agents reason about. By BFi−j in all agent j’s epistemic alternatives
there are no more individuals in agent i’s domains than j presently considers,
so agent j can generalise her knowledge. Similarly, by CBFi−j in all agent
j’s epistemic alternatives there are no fewer individuals in agent i’s domains,
so agent j can particularise her knowledge. When an agent can generalise
and particularise her knowledge on a domain of objects, we say that she has
knowledge of that domain, at least implicitly.
For the same reasons we have also that:
SGS |= Admj(t)→ KiAdmj(t) NecAdm
SGS |= ¬Admj(t)→ Ki¬Admj(t) Nec¬Adm
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By these validities every agent knows whether any individual belongs to the
domain of admissible individuals of any other agent. In the language LDn the
Barcan formulas hold also for the distributed knowledge operator DG:
SGS |= ∀iyDGφ→ DG∀iyφ SGS |= Admj(t)→ DGAdmj(t)
SGS |= DG∀iyφ→ ∀iyDGφ SGS |= ¬Admj(t)→ DG¬Admj(t)
These principles are rather strong even for an external account of knowledge,
in which knowledge is not explicitly possessed by agents, but rather attributed
to them by an external observer. After all, we introduced different domains
of quantification for expressing that each agent has only a limited access to
the totality of individuals. If they know all other agents’ domains as well
as theirs, the whole construction seems questionable. Given this, we could
turn to varying SGS, where all formulas above are not valid, as quantification
domains change according to global states. But this would undermine the
agents’ knowledge of their own domains, something equally unwelcomed.
Our solution consists in admitting BFi−j and CBFi−j only for i = j. In fact,
these formulas hold on the class of regular SGS:
SGSreg |= ∀iyKiφ→ Ki∀iyφ BFi−i
SGSreg |= Ki∀iyφ→ ∀iyKiφ CBFi−i
In this way we solve the problem of having quantification domains Di(s) and
Fi(s), for i ∈ A, depending also on the local states of agents other than i: in
regular SGS quantification domains can be considered part of each agent’s lo-
cal state. By restricting our attention to regular SGS satisfying the restricted
versions BFi−i and CBFi−i of the Barcan formulas, we model the scenario in
which agents know their respective domains of quantification, but not neces-
sarily the other agents’.
Finally, we remark that in the present semantical framwork we admit possi-
bilia, i.e., objects in D and F which do not appear in quantification domains
Di or Fi, for some agent i ∈ A. Moreover, agents may have knowledge about
these possible entities, that is, there are models in whichKiP (t) is true at some
world w, for some Iσ(t, w) belonging to D, but Iσ(t, w) /∈ Di. The existence
of something like possible objects is a rather debated topic in the philosophy
of modal logic, see [43] and [38] for a review of classic possibilist and actu-
alist accounts. However, in AI the introduction of possibilia can be useful to
model specific scenarios. For instance, an agent i may know that no horse flies,
i.e., ∀ixKi¬(Horse(x) ∧ Fly(x)), and yet she studied the Greek classics and
knows that Pegasus is a flying horse, i.e., Ki(Horse(Pegasus)∧Fly(Pegasus)).
A solution to this puzzle consists in considering Pegasus a possible object in
D \Di.
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3.5 Individual terms and identity
As regards identity, observe that the following formulas hold for global terms
on every system of global states:
SGS |= (s = s′)→ (φ[x/s]→ φ[x/s′]) Subst
SGS |= (s = s′)→ Ki(s = s
′) KiId
SGS |= (s 6= s′)→ Ki(s 6= s
′) KiDif
but not for local terms:
SGS 6|= (u = u′)→ (φ[z/u]→ φ[z/u′])
SGS 6|= (u = u′)→ Ki(u = u
′)
SGS 6|= (u 6= u′)→ Ki(u 6= u
′)
These (in)validities motivate the names of flexible and rigid terms given in
[48]. Identical global terms can be substitued in any formula, in particular in
epistemic contexts; whereas for local terms we have only:
SGS |= (u = u′)→ (φ[z/u]→ φ[z/u′]), for atomic φ
but φ has to be different from Admi(u):
SGS 6|= (u = u′)→ (Admi(u)→ Admi(u
′))
as Admi is an intensional predicate and it can be that the individuals I
σ(u, w),
Iσ(u′, w) ∈ D are identical, the intensional object Iσ(u) belongs to Fi but
Iσ(u′) /∈ Fi.
The relationship between local and global terms is particularly relevant for the
present investigations. We remarked that it can be the case that agent i cannot
distinguish between states s and s′, and yet we may have that Iσ(u)(s) ∈ Di
and Iσ(u)(s′) 6∈ Di, for some local term u. This means that in state s agent i
is aware of the object being denoted by u, but she does not know that she is.
This feature of the semantics can be considered unsatisfactory, but one should
note that agents do not always explicitly know their domains of quantification,
as it is the case in varying QIS. However, it is possible to address the point
above by assuming formula (2): for every i ∈ A, for f ∈ F , if li(s) = li(s
′) and
f(s) ∈ Di, then f(s
′) ∈ Di. We can capture this constraint by means of the
following formula:
∃ix(d = x)→ Ki∃ix(d = x) (13)
We can easily check that the following correspondence holds:
S |= ∃ix(d = x)→ Ki∃ix(d = x) iff S satisfies formula (2)
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Further, we can restrict this principle to only the intensional objects contained
in each Fi. According to formula (3), an agent i knows the denotation of only
the intensional objects in his domain of quantification. Similarly to the above,
this formula can by captured by means of a formula in Ln:
∀iz(∃ix(z = x)→ Ki∃ix(z = x)) (14)
The following correspondence can be promptly proved:
S |= ∀iz(∃ix(z = x)→ Ki∃ix(z = x)) iff S satisfies formula (3)
Finally, we strengthen formula (14) by requiring that the denotation of every
local term in the domain of agent i is unconditionally an individual belonging
to agent i’s domain of individuals, that is, formula (4) holds. Also in this case
we can provide a formal counterpart to this formula in Ln,
∀izKi∃ix(z = x) (15)
by noting that the following correspondence holds:
S |= ∀izKi∃ix(z = x) iff S satisfies formula (4)
Moreover, we can require that each agent i knows at least the denotation of
the local terms in her domain of quantification. This is tantamount to formula
(5), which can be captured by the following formula in Ln:
∀iz((z = u)→ Ki(z = u)) (16)
similarly to the above, we can prove that the following correspondence holds:
S |= ∀iz((z = u)→ Ki(z = u)) iff S satisfies formula (5)
We can combine formulas (16) and (15) in order to express formula (6), i.e., the
fact each agent i knows the denotation of local terms, which is an individual in
her domain of quantification. We express formula (6) by means of the following
formula in Ln:
∀iz∃ixKi(z = x) (17)
and the respective correspondence holds:
S |= ∀iz∃ixKi(z = x) iff S satisfies formula (6)
Note that formula (17) is the de re version of (15). According to (17) for every
local term u, there is exactly one individual which is known by agent i to be
the denotation of u.
In the next section we will consider formulas (13)-(17) and we will prove
completeness of the semantical classes introduced with respect to the rele-
vant axiomatisations. As a summary, in the next lemma we list formulas and
corresponding classes of systems of global states and Kripke frames.
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Lemma 28 In the table below, for every row, the formula in the first column
is valid on all and only the SGS in the second column, and it is valid in all
and only frames in the third colum.
Formulas SGS Frames
∀iyKiφ↔ Ki∀iyφ SGS
reg Kreg
(13) ∃ix(d = x)→ Ki∃ix(d = x) SGS
2 K2
(14) ∀iz(∃ix(z = x)→ Ki∃ix(z = x)) SGS
3 K3
(15) ∀izKi∃ix(z = x) SGS
4 K4
(16) ∀iz((z = u)→ Ki(z = u)) SGS
5 K5
(17) ∀iz∃ixKi(z = x) SGS
6 K6
Proof. We do not provide the details of the proof, but just note that the
validity of formulas on the corresponding classes of SGS follows by the remarks
earlier in this section, while the validity on Kripke frames follows by corollaries
(15)-(18). 2
We remark that classes SGS6 of systems of global states and K6 of Kripke
frames are tantamount to the intersections SGS4∩SGS5 and K4∩K5 respec-
tively.
4 Axiomatisations
In this section we introduce sound and complete axiomatisations for all the
classes of SGS presented in Sections 2 and 3. We start by considering the first-
order epistemic system Q.S5n, then we tune this calculus to cover also varying,
objectual, and regular SGS, as well as the structures satisfying formulas (2)-
(12). While resolution and natural deduction calculi are more suitable when
dealing with automated reasoning, for the purpose of the completeness proof
Hilbert-style systems are easier to handle.
4.1 System Q.S5n
The system Q.S5n on the language Ln is a first-order multi-modal version of
the propositional system S5. Hereafter we list the axioms and inference rules.
We use ⇒ to denote the inference relation between formulas.
Definition 29 (Q.S5n) The system Q.S5n on Ln contains the following schemes
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of axioms and inference rules:
Taut every instance of classic propositional tautologies
K Ki(φ→ ψ)→ (Kiφ→ Kiψ)
T Kiφ→ φ
4 Kiφ→ KiKiφ
5 ¬Kiφ→ Ki¬Kiφ
MP φ→ ψ, φ⇒ ψ
Nec φ⇒ Kiφ
Ex ∀iyφ→ (Admi(t)→ φ[y/t])
Gen φ→ (Admi(t)→ ψ[y/t])⇒ φ→ ∀iyψ, for y not free in φ
BFi−j ∀iyKjφ→ Kj∀iyφ
CBFi−j Kj∀iyφ→ ∀iyKjφ
Id t = t
Func t = t′ → (t′′[y/t] = t′′[y/t′])
Subst t = t′ → (φ[y/t]→ φ[y/t′]), for atomic φ
KiId s = s
′ → Ki(s = s
′)
KiDif s 6= s
′ → Ki(s 6= s
′)
The first group of postulates axiomatises the multi-modal system S5n. Fol-
lowing this, we have the free logic postulates for quantification for both global
and local terms. The Barcan formulas guarantee that the domains of admis-
sible individuals are independent from global states, as shown below. Finally,
we have axioms Id, Func and Subst for all terms, while KiId and KiDif
hold only for global terms. We note without proof that the axioms Subst and
KiId are sufficient for deriving the substitution of identical global terms in
any first-order modal formula φ.
We define proofs and theorems as standard: ⊢Q.S5n φ means that φ ∈ Ln is a
theorem in Q.S5n. Moreover, we say that φ ∈ Ln is derivable in Q.S5n from
the set ∆ of formulas in Ln, and write ∆ ⊢Q.S5n φ, iff there are φ1, . . . , φm ∈ ∆
such that ⊢Q.S5n φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φm → φ.
Lemma 30 Among the theorems of Q.S5n we have:
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NecAdm ⊢Q.S5n Admi(t)→ KjAdmi(t) Knowledge of Admissibility
Nec¬Adm ⊢Q.S5n ¬Admi(t)→ Kj¬Admi(t) Knowledge of Inadmissibility
Proof. The proof for NecAdm goes as follows:
a. ⊢Q.S5n Admi(t)→ Admi(t) propositional tautology
b. ⊢Q.S5n ∀iyAdmi(y) from a by Gen
c. ⊢Q.S5n Kj∀iyAdmi(y) from b by Nec
d. ⊢Q.S5n ∀iyKjAdmi(y)→ (Admi(t)→ KjAdmi(t)) axiom Ex
e. ⊢Q.S5n Kj∀iyAdmi(y)→ (Admi(t)→ KjAdmi(t)) from d by CBFi−j
f. ⊢Q.S5n Admi(t)→ KjAdmi(t) from c, e by MP
The proof for Nec¬Adm can be obtained similarly. 2
4.2 Further Systems
By suitably tuning the systems Q.S5n we can obtain provably sound and com-
plete axiomatisations for all classes of SGS in Sections 2 and 3. For instance,
by dropping BFi−j and CBFi−j , and by restricting these postulates to i = j,
we can axiomatise varying and regular SGS respectively. Further, we can ax-
iomatise objectual SGS by restricting Q.S5n to formulas where only global
terms appear. Finally, we add the axioms for distributed knowledge to Q.S5n
in order to axiomatise the set of validities on the language LDn . Hereafter we
list the relevant systems.
Definition 31 (Q.S5varn ) The system Q.S5
var
n on the language Ln is ob-
tained from Q.S5n by eliminating the axioms BFi−j and CBFi−j.
(Q.S5regn ) The systems Q.S5
reg
n on the language Ln is obtained from Q.S5n
by restricting BFi−j and CBFi−j to i = j.
(Q.S5objn ) The system Q.S5
obj
n is obtained by restricting Q.S5n to the lan-
guage Lobjn .
(Q.S5Dn ) The system Q.S5
D
n on the language L
D
n is obtained by extending
Q.S5objn with the following postulates for distributed knowledge:
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K DG(φ→ ψ)→ (DGφ→ DGψ)
T DGφ→ φ
4 DGφ→ DGDGφ
5 ¬DGφ→ DG¬DGφ
D1 D{i}φ↔ Kiφ
D2 DGφ→ DG′, for G ⊆ G
′
Nec φ⇒ DGφ
(Q.S5kn) For 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, the system Q.S5
k
n is obtained by adding formula
(k + 7) to Q.S5n.
Note that formulas NecAdm and Nec¬Adm are not provable in Q.S5varn ,
while for system Q.S5regn we have only restricted versions of NecAdm and
Nec¬Adm, for i = j.
4.3 Correspondence Theory
In this section we define a correspondence theory between properties of frames
and validity of formulas at first-order. In what follows a systems S is identified
with the set of its theorems.
Lemma 32 Let 2 ≤ k ≤ 6. In the following table, for each row, F is an S-
frame, i.e., F |= S, iff F belongs to the class of frames in the second column.
QML Systems Kripke frames
Q.S5n K
Q.S5varn K
var
Q.S5regn K
reg
Q.S5objn K
obj
Q.S5Dn K
obj
Q.S5kn K
k
Proof. We provide an outline of the proof by showing the right to left impli-
cations for some systems. We show that ⊢S φ implies F |= φ, where F belongs
to the relevant class of frames. The proof is by induction on the length of the
proof of φ in S, axioms are the base case and inference rules are the inductive
step.
Q.S5n. We can easily check that the axioms of Q.S5n hold on every Kripke
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model and the inference rules preserve validity. We provide detailed proofs
only for axioms BFi−j , and KiId. As regards BFi−j , assume that (M
σ, w) |=
∀izKjφ. This means that for all f ∈ Fi, for all w
′ ∈ W , w ∼j w
′ implies
(Mσ(
z
f), w′) |= φ. Therefore, for all w′ ∈ W , for all f ∈ Fi, w ∼j w
′ implies
(Mσ(
z
f), w′) |= φ, that is, (Mσ, w) |= Kj∀izφ.
As to KiId, suppose that (M
σ, w) |= s = s′ and w ∼j w
′. By the first hypoth-
esis Iσ(s, w) = Iσ(s′, w), and Iσ(s, w′) = Iσ(s′, w′) because s and s′ are global
terms. Therefore (Mσ, w′) |= s = s′ and (Mσ, w) |= Ki(s = s
′).
Q.S5varn . Proving that the axioms of Q.S5
var
n hold on every varying Kripke
model, and that the inference rules preserve validity can be done similarly as
in the previous case.
Q.S5regn . We show that axiom CBFi−i holds on every regular Kripke model;
the rest may be done similarly to the case Q.S5n. Assume that (M
σ, w) |=
Ki∀ixφ. This means that for any w
′ ∈W , w ∼i w
′ implies that for a ∈ Di(w
′),
we have (Mσ(
x
a), w′) |= φ. But since Di(w) = Di(w
′), w ∼i w
′ implies
(Mσ(
x
a), w′) |= φ for any a ∈ D(w′). So, (Mσ, w) |= ∀iKixφ.
Q.S5objn . We show that axiom D2 holds in every objectual Kripke model. As-
sume that (Mσ, w) |= DGφ and G ⊆ G
′. This means that for any w,w′ ∈W ,
(w,w′) ∈
⋂
i∈G ∼i implies (M
σ, w′) |= φ. But G ⊆ G′, so (w,w′) ∈
⋂
i∈G′ ∼i
implies (Mσ, w′) |= φ. Therefore, (Mσ, w) |= DG′φ.
Q.S56n. We show that formula (17) holds in SGS
6 = SGS4 ∩ SGS5. As-
sume that f ∈ Fi, by the constraint on SGS
4 we know that there exists
an a = f(s) ∈ Di. Further, if li(s) = li(s
′) then f(s) = f(s′) = a ∈ Di by the
constraint on SGS5. Thus, ∀iz∃ixKi(z = x) holds.
As regards the left to right implication, we consider the cases for Q.S51n and
Q.S53n.
Q.S51n. Assume that F |= ∃ix(d = x) → Ki∃ix(d = x), w ∼i w
′ and
f(w) ∈ Di. Define a model M based on F such that I(d) = f . This means
that (M, w) |= ∃ix(d = x), therefore (M, w) |= Ki∃ix(d = x). Hence,
(M, w′) |= ∃ix(d = x), which is tantamount to f(w
′) ∈ Di.
Q.S53n. Assume that F |= ∀izKi∃ix(z = x), w ∈ W , and f ∈ Fi. Let M be
a model based on F , we have that (M, w) |= ∀izKi∃ix(z = x), in particular
(Mσ, w) |= ∃ix(z = x), for σ(z) = f . Thus, there exists a ∈ Di such that
a = f(w) ∈ Di. 2
We note that a result similar to Lemma 32 can be obtained also for systems
of global states by means of the maps in Section 2.5. We say that P is a QIS
for a system S iff every theorem of S is valid on P, and S is an SGS for S,
or S-SGS, iff every model based on S is a model for S. We write S-SGS for
denoting the class of S-SGS.
Lemma 33 Let 2 ≤ k ≤ 6. The following identities between classes of SGS
hold:
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Q.S5n-SGS = SGS
Q.S5varn -SGS = SGS
var
Q.S5regn -SGS = SGS
reg
Q.S5objn -SGS = SGS
obj
Q.S5Dn -SGS = SGS
obj
Q.S5kn-SGS = SGS
k
Proof. The identies above follow from Lemma 32 and the maps in Sec-
tion 2.5 2
4.4 Soundness
In showing that our QML systems are sound and complete axiomatisations of
the corresponding classes of system of global states we first prove soundness.
Lemma 34 (Soundness) Every QML system S is sound with respect to the
class of frames for S, therefore S is sound also with respect to the class of
SGS for S.
Proof. We observe that by the right to left implication of Lemma 32 if ⊢S φ
then F |= φ, where F belongs to the class of S-frames. By the definition of
validity on systems of global states, we obtain that ⊢S φ implies S |= φ, where
S belongs to the class of S-SGS. 2
We summarize the soundness results in the following table. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ 6,
for any row, the QML system in the first column is sound with respect to the
corresponding class of frames in the second column, and therefore it is sound
for the corresponding class of SGS in the third column.
QML Systems Kripke frames Systems of global states
Q.S5n K SGS
Q.S5varn K
var SGSvar
Q.S5regn K
reg SGSreg
Q.S5objn K
obj SGSobj
Q.S5Dn K
obj SGSobj
Q.S5kn K
k SGSk
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4.5 Completeness of Q.S5n
This section is devoted to showing completeness for the QML systems intro-
duced above with respect to the corresponding classes of Kripke frames. The
completeness of Q.S5n is proved by means of standard techniques in quanti-
fied modal logic [19,22,33] suitably extended to fit in the present framework
with indexed quantifiers and modalities, local terms, identity. Specifically, we
adopt the particular version of canonical models given by Thomason in [62] for
languages with an existence predicate. As standard, we show that if 0Q.S5n φ
then there exists a Kripke modelM such thatM 6|= φ. In particular, we show
that the canonical model MQ.S5n for Q.S5n to be defined below is a model
according to Definition 22, it is based on a frame for Q.S5n andM
Q.S5n 6|= φ.
Therefore, the following is a sufficient condition to prove completeness.
Proposition 35 If Q.S5n does not prove a formula φ ∈ Ln, then the canon-
ical model MQ.S5n for Q.S5n does not validate φ.
This result relies on two lemmas: the saturation lemma and the truth lemma.
Their proofs need the following definitions, where Liφ is defined as ¬Ki¬φ
and Λ is any set of formulas in Ln:
Λ is consistent iff Λ 0Q.S5n ⊥;
Λ is maximal iff for every φ ∈ Ln, either φ ∈ Λ or ¬φ ∈ Λ;
Λ is max-cons iff Λ is consistent and maximal;
Λ is rich iff ∃iyφ ∈ Λ implies that there is a term t ∈ Ln
such that Admi(t) ∧ φ[y/t] ∈ Λ;
Λ is Lj-rich iff φ0 ∧ Lj(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lj(φk ∧ Lj∃iyφk+1) . . .) ∈ Λ
for y not free in φ0, . . . , φk implies there is t ∈ Ln such that
φ0 ∧ Lj(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lj(φk ∧ Lj(Admi(t) ∧ φk+1[y/t])) . . .) ∈ Λ,
Λ is saturated iff Λ is max-cons, rich and Lj-rich, for every j ∈ A.
The constraint on Lj-richness, which is due to Thomason [62], is needed in
order to guarantee that the canonical model for Q.S5n has a single outer
domain D. We briefly sketch the proof of the saturation lemma and refer to
[33] for details; the extension to the multi-modal case is straightforward.
Lemma 36 (Saturation lemma) If ∆ is a consistent set of the formulas
in Ln, then it can be extended to a saturated set Π on some expansion L
+
n
obtained by adding to Ln an infinite set of new local constants and an infinite
set of new global constants.
Proof. Let θ0, θ1, . . . be an enumeration of the formulas in L
+
n , and let there
be enumerations of the new global and local constants m0, m1, . . .. We define
by recursion a chain of sets of formulas in L+n as follows:
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Γ0 =∆
Γ2n+1 =


Γ2n ∪ {Admi(m2n) ∧ θn[y/m2n]} if Γ2n ∪ {∃yθn} is consistent and
m2n /∈ Γ2n ∪ {θn} is the first new constant;
Γ2n otherwise.
Γ2n+2 =


Γ2n+1 ∪ {φ0 ∧ Lj(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lj(φk ∧ Lj(Admi(m2n+1) ∧ φk+1[y/m2n+1])) . . .)}
if Γ2n+1 ∪ {φ0 ∧ Lj(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lj(φk ∧ Lj∃iyφk+1) . . .)} is consistent
and m2n+1 is the first variable not in Γ2n+1, φ1, . . . , φk+1;
Γ2n+1 otherwise.
By induction we can prove that every Γn is consistent. Thus, by the chain
lemma Γ =
⋃
n∈N Γn is a consistent, rich and Lj-rich set of formulas in L
+
n , for
every j ∈ A. By Lindenbaum’s lemma Γ can be extended to a saturated set
Π ⊇ ∆ in L+n . 2
As a result, if 0Q.S5n φ then the set {¬φ} is consistent and by the saturation
lemma we obtain a saturated set Π ⊇ {¬φ}.
In order to introduce the canonical model MQ.S5n for Q.S5n we need a few
more definitions. For closed global terms v, v′, define v ∼w v
′ iff (v = v′) ∈ w.
This is an equivalence relation and we take [v]w = {v
′ | v ∼w v
′} to be the
equivalence class of v in w.
The accessibility relation in MQ.S5n is defined so that wRiw
′ iff {φ | Kiφ ∈
w} ⊆ w′: by axioms T , 4 and 5 we can show that Ri is an equivalence relation.
Further, by axioms KiId and KiDif the definition of [v]w is provably inde-
pendent from the choice of w and v - i.e., wRiw
′ implies [v]w = [v]w′ - so we
simply write [v]. We define each Di(w) as the set {[v] | Admi(v) ∈ w}. By
NecAdm and Nec¬Adm we can show that also this definition is independent
from the choice of w, therefore we simply write Di.
Moreover, for every closed local term r we introduce a function fr such that:
fr(w)=


[v] if there is a v such that (r = v) ∈ w;
{r′ | (r′ = r) ∈ w} otherwise.
Each Fi(w) is the set {fr | Admi(r) ∈ w}: by NecAdm and Nec¬Adm also
this definition is provably independent from the choice of w, so we simply
write Fi.
Given these definitions, we present the canonical model for Q.S5n as follows:
Definition 37 The canonical model for Q.S5n on the language Ln, with an
expansion L+n , is the tuple M
Q.S5n = 〈W, {Ri}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, F, {Fi}i∈A, I〉
such that:
• W is the set of all saturated sets of formulas in L+n ;
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• for i ∈ A, w,w′ ∈W , wRiw
′ iff {φ | Kiφ ∈ w} ⊆ w
′;
• the domain D of individuals is the set {[v] | v ∈ L+n }∪{fr(w) | r ∈ L
+
n , w ∈
W}, and for each i ∈ A, Di = {[v] | Admi(v) ∈ w};
• the domain F of intensional objects is the set {fr | r ∈ L
+
n }, and for each
i ∈ A, Fi = {fr | Admi(r) ∈ w};
• I is an interpretation of L+n such that:
· I(c) = [c] and I(d) = fd;
· for a1, . . . , ak ∈ D ∪ F , I(f
k)(~a) is a function such that
I(fk)(~a)(w)=


[fk(~v)] if every ai = [vi];
ffk(~e)(w) for ei = vi if ai = [vi], or ei = ri if ai = fri
· for a1, . . . , ak ∈ D, 〈~a〉 ∈ I(P
k, w) iff P k(~e) ∈ w, for ei = vi and ai = [vi],
or ei = ri and ai = fri(w).
Note that the interpretation of functions and predicates is well defined by ax-
ioms Func and Subst. The following proposition holds by the remarks above.
Proposition 38 The canonical model MQ.S5n for Q.S5n satisfies the con-
straints in Definition 22, so MQ.S5n is a Kripke model.
Proof. Assume that 0Q.S5n φ, then the set {¬φ} is consistent, so by Lemma 36
it can be extended to a saturated set of formulas in L+n . Therefore, the set
W of possible worlds is non-empty. We remarked that by axioms T , 4 and 5,
each relation Ri is reflexive, transitive and euclidean, i.e., it is an equivalence
relation. Further, the domainsD and F are non-empty by definition of L+n , and
each Di (respectively Fi) is trivially a subset ofD (respectively F ). Finally, the
interpretation I is well-defined and satisfies the constraints on Kripke models
by the remarks above. 2
Now let σ be an assignment for local and global variables into D and F
respectively, we can show the following:
Lemma 39 For every w ∈M, t ∈ L+n , for σ(yi) = I(ei),
Iσ(t[~y], w) = I(t[~y/~e])(w)
Proof. This can be shown by induction on the length of t. We give the proof
for t = f(t1, . . . , tk), y = z, and e = d:
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Iσ(t[z], w) = Iσ(f(t1[z], . . . , tk[z]), w)= I(f)(I
σ(t1[z], w), . . . , I
σ(tk[z], w))
= I(f)(I(t1[z/d])(w), . . . , I(tk[z/d])(w))
= I(f)(I(t1[z/d]), . . . , I(tk[z/d]))(w)
= I(f(t1[z/d], . . . , tk[z/d]))(w)
= I(f(t1, . . . , tk)[z/d])(w)
= I(t[z/d)(w)
2
By Lemma 39 the base case of the truth lemma below follows. In the rest of
this section we simply write M for MQ.S5n.
Lemma 40 (Truth lemma) For every w ∈M, φ ∈ L+n , for σ(yi) = I(ei),
(Mσ, w) |= φ[~y] iff φ[~y/~e] ∈ w
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of φ ∈ L+n .
φ = P k(t1, . . . , tk). By the definition of satisfaction and Lemma 39:
(Mσ, w) |= P k(t1, . . . , tk)[~y] iff 〈I
σ(t1[~y], w), . . . , I
σ(tk[~y], w)〉 ∈ I(P
k, w)
iff 〈I(t1[~y/~e])(w), . . . , I(tk[~y/~e])(w)〉 ∈ I(P
k, w)
iff P k(t1[~y/~e], . . . , tk[~y/~e]) ∈ w
φ = t = t′. Similar to the previous case.
φ = ¬ψ, ψ → ψ′. The cases for the propositional connectives follow by the
maximality and consistency of the worlds in the canonical model.
φ = ∀izψ. ⇐ Assume that ∀izψ[z, ~y/~e] ∈ w and f is an individual in Fi. This
means that f = fr, for some r such that Admi(r), then ψ[r, ~y/~e] ∈ w by Ex. By
the induction hypothesis (Mσ, w) |= ψ[r, ~y], therefore (Mσ(
z
fr
), w) |= ψ[z, ~y].
By the arbitrariness of the variant σ
(
z
fr
)
we obtain (Mσ, w) |= ∀izψ[z, ~y].
⇒ Assume that ∀izψ[z, ~y/~e] /∈ w. Since w is max-cons, ∃iz¬ψ[z, ~y/~e] ∈ w. But
w is rich, so there exists d ∈ LCon such that Admi(d) ∧ ¬ψ[d, ~y/~e] ∈ w. This
means that fd ∈ Fi and by induction hypothesis (M
σ, w) 6|= ψ[d, ~y]. Thus,
there is fd ∈ Fi such that (M
σ( zfd), w) 6|= ψ[z, ~y], i.e., (Mσ, w) 6|= ∀izψ[z, ~y].
φ = ∀ixψ. The proof goes as in the previous case.
φ = Kiψ. ⇐ Assume that Kiψ[~y/~e] ∈ w and wRiw
′. By definition of Ri,
ψ[~y/~e] ∈ w′ and by induction hypothesis (Mσ, w′) |= ψ[~y]. Thus, (Mσ, w) |=
Kiψ[~y].
⇒ Assume that Kiψ[~y/~e] /∈ w. Note that the set {φ | Kiφ ∈ w} ∪ {¬ψ[~y/~e]}
is consistent: if not, there would be φ1, . . . , φm ∈ {φ | Kiφ ∈ w} such that
⊢
∧
φ → ψ[~y/~e]. By axiom K, ⊢
∧
Kiφ → Kiψ[~y/~e] and since
∧
Kiφ ∈ w,
also Kiψ[~y/~e] ∈ w against hypothesis. Since {φ | Kiφ ∈ w} ∪ {¬ψ[~y/~e]} is
consistent, we can extend it to a saturated set w′ on L+n (see [62] for further
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details) such that wRiw
′ and (Mσ, w′) |= ¬ψ[~y] by induction hypothesis.
Hence, (Mσ, w) 6|= Kiψ[~y]. 2
By the truth lemma we conclude that the canonical model M is a model for
Q.S5n, based on a Kripke frame, falsifying any unprovable formula φ. Thus,
we state the following completeness result.
Theorem 41 (Completeness) The system Q.S5n is complete with respect
to the class K of Kripke frames, i.e., K |= φ implies ⊢Q.S5n φ.
Further, we have completeness also with respect to systems of global states. In
fact, if 0Q.S5n φ then by Theorem 41 there exists a model M = 〈F , I〉 based
on a frame F , which falsifies φ. Define the quantified interpreted system P as
〈g(F), I〉: by definition P |= φ iff Pf = 〈f(g(F)), I〉 models φ, but by Lemma
14 the frame f(g(F)) is isomorphic to F . Hence, P 6|= φ. As a consequence,
the following implications hold:
SGS |= φ ⇒ K |= φ ⇒ ⊢Q.S5n φ
and we have a further completeness result.
Corollary 42 (Completeness) The system Q.S5n is complete with respect
to the class SGS of systems of global states, i.e., SGS |= φ implies ⊢Q.S5n φ.
By combining together the soundness and completeness theorems we obtain
the main result of this section.
Corollary 43 (Soundness and Completeness) For every φ ∈ Ln,
SGS |= φ iff ⊢Q.S5n φ
We conclude that Q.S5n is a sound and complete axiomatisation of the va-
lidities on the general class of systems of global states.
4.6 Completeness for other axiomatisations
We now show how to modify the techniques applied in the previous subsection
to obtain completeness also for the other classes of Kripke frames and systems
of global states considered. We start with varying and regular frames.
Theorem 44 (Completeness) The system Q.S5varn is complete with respect
to the class Kvar of varying frames.
Proof. If a formula φ ∈ Ln is not provable in Q.S5
var
n , then we define the
canonical model MQ.S5
var
n for Q.S5varn as in Definition 37. Note that neither
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NecAdm nor Nec¬Adm are theorems in Q.S5varn , so we cannot show that
the various Di(w) = {[v] | Admi(v) ∈ w} and Fi(w) = {fr | Admi(r) ∈
w} are independent from the choice of w. However, we can prove that the
canonical model is based on a varying Kripke frame. Also, Proposition 38
and Lemmas 39, 40 hold also for MQ.S5
var
n , as their proofs do not require the
Barcan formulas. Therefore, the canonical modelMQ.S5
var
n satisfies ¬φ and we
have completeness for varying frames. 2
Theorem 45 (Completeness) The system Q.S5regn is complete with respect
to the class Kreg of regular frames.
Proof.As regardsQ.S5regn , we show that the canonical modelM
Q.S5regn defined
as in Definition 37 satisfies constraint (7) on regular frames, i.e.,
• for all w,w′ ∈W , wRiw
′ implies Di(w) = Di(w
′) and Fi(w) = Fi(w
′)
Assume that wRiw
′ and Admi(v) ∈ w. By the restricted version CBFi−i of the
converse of the Barcan formula we can show that Admi(v)→ KiAdmi(v) ∈ w,
and by definition of Ri also Admi(v) ∈ w
′. Thus, Di(w) ⊆ Di(w
′). The other
direction of the inclusion follows by symmetry of Ri. The proof of Fi(w) =
Fi(w
′) is similar. Further, Proposition 38 and Lemmas 39, 40 hold also for
MQ.S5
reg
n , therefore we have completeness for regular frames. 2
By axiomatising the class of regular SGS we showed that the restricted versions
of the Barcan formulas considered are powerful enough to characterise the idea
of quantification domains as part of agents’ local state.
We now consider the completeness results for systems Q.S5objn and Q.S5
D
n
with respect to objectual frames. Let φ ∈ Lobjn be a formula not provable in
Q.S5objn , we define the canonical model for Q.S5
obj
n as the restriction ofM
Q.S5n
to constant terms.
Definition 46 The canonical model for Q.S5objn on the language L
obj
n , with
an expansion Lobj+n , is the tuple M
Q.S5objn = 〈W, {Ri}i∈A, D, {Di}i∈A, I〉 such
that:
• W is the set of all saturated sets of formulas in Lobj+n ;
• for i ∈ A, Ri and Di are defined as in Definition 37;
• D = {[v] | v ∈ Lobj+n };
• I is an interpretation of Lobj+n such that:
· I(c) = [c];
· for a1, . . . , ak ∈ D, I(f
k)(~a) = [fk(~v)], for ai = [vi];
· for a1, . . . , ak ∈ D, 〈~a〉 ∈ I(P
k, w) iff P k(~v) ∈ w, for ai = [vi].
Proposition 38 and Lemmas 39 and 40 hold also for MQ.S5
obj
n : the proof is
similar to those presented earlier. It follows that the canonical modelMQ.S5
obj
n
satisfies ¬φ, so we have completeness for objectual frames:
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Theorem 47 (Completeness) The system Q.S5objn is complete with respect
to the class Kobj of objectual frames.
As regards the system Q.S5Dn , we extend to first-order the completeness proof
in [18] for proposional systems with distributed knowledge consisting in un-
ravelling the canonical model to obtain a model which is a tree. Note that an
independent completeness proof for these systems appeared in [31].
First, we consider the following definition of canonical model, where ℘+(A) is
the set of non-empty subsets of A:
Definition 48 The canonical model for Q.S5Dn on the language L
D
n , with an
expansion LD+n , is the tuple M
Q.S5Dn = 〈W, {Rl}l∈A∪℘+(A), D, {Di}i∈A, I〉 such
that:
• W is the set of saturated sets of formulas in LD+n ;
• for i ∈ A, Ri, Di, and D, I are defined as in Definition 46;
• for G ∈ ℘+(A), wRGw
′ iff {φ | DGφ ∈ w} ⊆ w
′.
Lemma 36 holds also for the system Q.S5Dn . Therefore, if 6⊢Q.S5Dn φ there exists
a saturated set w ⊇ {¬φ}, so the set W of possible worlds in MQ.S5
D
n is
non-empty. By using axioms T , 4 and 5 we can show that the various RG are
equivalence relations. Moreover, by axioms D1 and D2 it follows that R{i} is
equal to Ri and RG ⊆
⋂
i∈GRi. However, in general RG 6=
⋂
i∈GRi [18]. This
remark gives the rationale for introducing the pseudo-satisfaction relation |=p,
defined as |= but for the distributed knowledge operator DG (in what follows
we simply write M for MQ.S5
D
n ):
(Mσ, w) |=p DGψ iff for every w
′ ∈W , wRGw
′ implies (Mσ, w′) |=p ψ
We state the truth lemma for the pseudo-satisfaction relation |=p. The proof
follows the one for Lemma 40, the distributed knowledge operator DG being
treated as the epistemic operator Ki.
Lemma 49 (Truth lemma) For w ∈M, ψ ∈ LD+n , for σ(xi) = [vi],
(Mσ, w) |=p ψ[~x] iff ψ[~x/~v] ∈ w
We now show that the techniques in [18] can be extended to first-order so that
M can be unwound into a structure M′ satisfying the same formulas.
In order to introduce M′ we need a few more definitions. Let w,w′ be worlds
in W , a path from w to w′ is a sequence 〈w1, l1, w2, l2, . . . , lk−1, wk〉 such that:
(1) w = w1 and w
′ = wk;
(2) w1, . . . , wk ∈W ;
(3) each lj is either an agent or a set of agents;
(4) 〈wj, wj+1〉 ∈ Rlj .
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The reduction of a path 〈w1, i1, w2, i2, . . . , ik−1, wk〉 is obtained by replacing
each maximal consecutive subsequence 〈wq, iq, wq+1, iq+1, . . . , ir−1, wr〉 where
iq = iq+1 = . . . = ir−1 by 〈wq, iq, wr〉. A path is said to be reduced is it is equal
to its reduction.
Given the canonical model M = 〈W, {Rl}l∈A∪℘+(A), D, {Di}i∈A, I〉 we de-
fine a structure M∗ = 〈W ∗, {R∗l }l∈A∪℘+(A), D
∗, {D∗i }i∈A, I
∗〉 and a surjec-
tive function h : W ∗ → W such that (i) M∗ is a tree, that is, for all
w,w′ ∈W ∗, there is at most one reduced path from w to w′; (ii) wR∗iw
′ implies
h(w)Rih(w
′); (iii) wR∗Gw
′ implies h(w)RGh(w
′); (iv) 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ I
∗(P k, w)
iff 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ I(P
k, h(w)).
The set of possible worlds W ∗ is defined by induction. Let W ∗1 be W , and
define W ∗k+1 as the set of worlds vw,l,w′ such that w ∈ W
∗
k , w
′ ∈ W and l is
an agent or group of agents. Let W ∗ =
⋃
k∈N W
∗
k , then define h : W
∗ → W
by letting h(w) = w, for w ∈ W ∗1 and h(vw,l,w′) = w
′, for w ∈ W ∗k . Further,
R∗l is the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of the relation defined
for w,w′ ∈ W ∗ if w′ = vw,l,w′′, for some w
′′ ∈ W , and h(w)Rlh(w
′). Finally,
I∗(P k, w) = I(P k, h(w)). We refer to [18] for a proof that M∗ and h satisfy
(i)-(iv) above. In particular, we can show what follows:
Lemma 50 For w ∈W ∗, ψ ∈ LD+n , we have
(M∗σ, w) |=p ψ iff (Mσ, h(w)) |=p ψ
Finally, we make use of the structure M∗ to define a Kripke model M′ that
falsifies the unprovable formula φ.
Definition 51 The model M′ = 〈W ′, {R′i}i∈A, D
′, {D′i}i∈A, I
′〉 is defined as
follows:
• W ′ = W ∗, D′ = D∗, D′i = D
∗
i , and I
′ = I∗;
• R′i is the transitive closure of R
∗
i ∪
⋃
i∈GR
∗
G.
Since the various R∗i and R
∗
G are reflexive, transitive and symmetric, R
′
i is an
equivalence relation. We state the following result about M′ and refer to [18]
for further details.
Lemma 52 For w ∈W ′, ψ ∈ LD+n , the following holds
(M′σ, w) |= ψ iff (M∗σ, w) |=p ψ
In conclusion, if φ ∈ LDn is not provable in Q.S5
D
n , then the canonical model
MQ.S5
D
n pseudo-satisfies ¬φ by Lemma 49. By Lemma 50 also M∗ pseudo-
satisfies ¬φ, and by the result above M′ does not validate φ. Hence, we have
the following completeness result.
Theorem 53 (Completeness) The system Q.S5Dn is complete with respect
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to the class of objectual frames.
Finally, we show that formulas (13)-(17) are sufficient to guarantee that the
canonical models for the systems Q.S5kn, for 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, defined as in Defini-
tion 37, satisfy the corresponding constraints.
Theorem 54 (Completeness) For 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, the system Q.S5kn is com-
plete with respect to the class Kk of Kripke frames.
Proof. We show that the canonical models for the systems Q.S5kn, for 2 ≤
k ≤ 6, satisfy the respective constraint on the classes Kk of Kripke frames.
Q.S51n. Assume that w ∼i w
′ and f(w) ∈ Di. If f ∈ F then f = fr for
some closed local term r, and by hypothesis fr(w) = [v], for some v such that
Admi(v) ∈ w. This means that (r = v) ∈ w, therefore ∃xi(r = x) ∈ w
′ by
formula (13). By richness of w′ there exists v′ such that Admi(v
′) ∈ w′ and
(r = v′) ∈ w′. Thus, fr(w
′) ∈ Di.
Q.S52n. This can be shown as above, but this time f = fr, for some closed
local term r, belongs to Fi.
Q.S53n. Assume that f = fr ∈ Fi for some closed local term r, then Ki∃ix(r =
x) ∈ w by formula (15), and in particular ∃ix(r = x) ∈ w. By the richness of
w there exists v such that Admi(v) ∈ w and (r = v) ∈ w. Therefore, there
exists [v] ∈ Di such that and fr(w) = [v].
Q.S54n. Assume that f = fr for some closed local term r belongs to Fi, fr(w) =
a ∈ D, and w ∼ w′. By hypothesis there exists a closed term t such that
I(t) = a ∈ D and (r = t) ∈ w. By formula (16) this implies thatKi(r = t) ∈ w
and (r = t) ∈ w′. Thus fr(w) = fr(w
′).
Q.S55n. Since formula (17) is equivalent to the conjuntion of formulas (15) and
(16), we can prove that for f ∈ Fi, w ∼i w
′ implies f(w) = f(w′) ∈ Di.
As a result, we have completeness with respect to all the relevant classes of
frames. 2
As for system Q.S5n, for every QML system S from completeness with respect
to Kripke frames we can derive completeness for systems of global state. In
fact, if 0S φ then by Kripke completeness there exists a model M = 〈F , I〉
based on a S-frame F , which falsifies φ. Define the quantified interpreted
system P as 〈γ(F), I〉, where γ is the relevant map from S-frames to SGS for
S. By definition P |= φ iff Pϕ = 〈ϕ(γ(F)), I〉models φ, where ϕ is the relevant
map from SGS for S to S-frames. By the results in Section 2.6, the frame
ϕ(γ(F)) is isomorphic to F . Hence, P 6|= φ. Thus, the following implications
hold:
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S-SGS |= φ ⇒ S-K |= φ ⇒ ⊢S φ
and we have a further completeness result.
Corollary 55 (Completeness) Every QML system S is complete with re-
spect to the class S-SGS of the systems of global states for S, that is, S-
SGS |= φ implies ⊢S φ.
By combining together the soundness and completeness theorems we obtain
the main result of this section.
Corollary 56 (Soundness and Completeness) For every formula φ in the
language of S,
S-SGS |= φ iff ⊢S φ
We conclude that our QML systems are sound and complete axiomatisations
of the validities on the corresponding classes of systems of global states. The
corollary below summarizes the main formal results of this paper.
Corollary 57 Let 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, for every row, the QML system in the first
column of the following table is a sound and complete axiomatisation with
respect to the corresponding class of Kripke frames and systems of global states:
QML Systems Kripke frames Systems of global states
Q.S5n K SGS
Q.S5varn K
var SGSvar
Q.S5regn K
reg SGSreg
Q.S5objn K
obj SGSobj
Q.S5Dn K
obj SGSobj
Q.S5kn K
k SGSk
5 Applications to Multi-Agent Systems
In this section we show how simple MAS scenarios can be modeled by means
of quantified interpreted systems. Specifically, in Section 5.1 we analyse the
scenario of battlefield, and in Section 5.2 we consider an infinite version of the
muddy children puzzle. Section 6 deals with a more complex application: a
formal analysis of message passing systems. We maintain that these investi-
gations show some of the advantages of first-order formalisms.
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5.1 Battlefield
In this subsection we model the popular game of battlefield as a quantified
interpreted system, then we describe it by means of the language Ln, for
n = 4. We start by considering a set of agents A = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and we assume
that each agent is assigned a quadrant in the region Z × Z as domain of
quantification:
D4 = {(x, y) | x ∈ Z
−, y ∈ Z+} D1 = {(x, y) | x, y ∈ Z
+}
D3 = {(x, y) | x, y ∈ Z
−} D2 = {(x, y) | x ∈ Z
+, y ∈ Z−}
Intuitively, the setDi represents the country of agent i. Note that, even though
in the battlefield game only a finite subset of Z × Z is considered, in several
scenarios either we are not able, or do not want, to bound in advance the size
of the game board. Thus, it can be useful to introduce a potentially infinite
playing board, even though at each step only a finite portion is considered.
We assume that each agent has 5 military units, whose positions are recorded
in his local state. Further, we consider couples (x, y) ∈ Di and triples (k, x, y),
for 1 ≤ k ≤ 5, to express that there is a military unit at (x, y) and that the
k-th military unit is at (x, y) respectively.
The local state li of agent i is defined as a 4-tuple 〈α1, α2, α3, α4〉 such that:
• αi is a 5-tuple 〈(1, x1, y1), . . . , (5, x5, y5)〉 recording the positions of agent i’s
units.
• for j 6= i, αj is a possibly empty sequence of triples (k, x, y) and couples
(x, y) recording the positions and identities of agent i’s enemies’ units.
Also, le is the local state of the environment recording the positions and iden-
tities of all units in similar fashion.
The set S contains the global states s = 〈le, l1, l2, l3, l4〉 such that if either
(x, y) ∈ αj(li) or (k, x, y) ∈ αj(li), then (k, x, y) ∈ αi(li). So, an agent may
not know the position or the identity of an enemy unit, but if she does, then
she cannot be wrong.
Each domain Fi of intensional objects contains the military units mui.k, for
1 ≤ k ≤ 5, such that mui.k(s) = (x, y) iff the triple (k, x, y) belongs to the
component αi of the local state li(s). Moreover, we assume that our language
has global and local constants for denoting the individuals in the various Di
and Fi. We use the same notation for syntactic and semantic elements as the
former mirror the latter, the context will disambiguate. Finally, let D contain
the real numbers, i.e., D ⊇ R.
The quantified interpreted system P contains all the global states consis-
tent with the definitions above. In particular, suppose that the initial state
s = 〈le, l1, l2, l3, l4〉, describing the position of the military units at the begin-
ning, is defined as follows:
l1(s) = 〈〈(1, 2, 2), (2, 6, 5), (3, 2, 7), (4, 4, 12), (5, 7, 9)〉, 〈〉, 〈〉, 〈〉〉
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l2(s) = 〈〈〉, 〈(1, 3,−3), (2, 7,−2), (3, 6,−5), (4, 3,−6), (5, 8,−9)〉, 〈〉, 〈〉〉
l3(s) = 〈〈〉, 〈〉, 〈(1,−3,−3), (2,−3,−6), (3,−6,−3), (4,−6,−8), (5,−8,−5)〉, 〈〉〉
l4(s) = 〈〈〉, 〈〉, 〈〉, 〈(1,−4, 4), (2,−3, 9), (3,−7, 7), (4,−5, 12), (5,−8, 11)〉〉
The QIS P containing s describes a situation in which the first military unit
of agent 1 is positioned at (2,2). In particular, agent 1 knows this fact:
(P, s) |= K1∃1z(z = (2, 2)) and also (P, s) |= ∃1zK1(z = (2, 2))
while agent 3 does not know this:
(P, s) |= ¬∃1zK3(z = (2, 2)) and also (P, s) |= ¬K3∃1z(z = (2, 2))
Thus, agent 1 has not only de dicto knowledge that one of his military units
is at (2,2), but he also has de re knowledge of the first of his units being at
(2,2).
Consider now a function dist returning the distance between two points in
Z× Z as a real number:
I(dist)((x, y), (x′, y′)) =
√
(x− x′)2 + (y − y′)2
We can check that agent 2 starts with all his military units within a distance
of less than 8. Further, he knows this fact, but agent 4 does not. To express
this, we introduce a relation symbol < with the obvious interpretation “less
than”.
(P, s) |= ∀2z, z
′K2(dist(z, z
′) < 8) but (P, s) 6|= ∀2z, z
′K4(dist(z, z
′) < 8)
The latter formula fails as agent 4’s local state is consistent with a different
state s′′′ such that l2(s
′′′) contains two military units at a distance greater than
8, that is, l4(s
′′′) = l4(s) but for instance
l2(s
′′′) = 〈〈〉, 〈(1, 30,−30), (2, 7,−2), (3, 6,−5), (4, 3,−6), (5, 8,−9)〉, 〈〉, 〈〉〉
Note that s′′′ ∈ P by definition of P.
Further, consider a global constant firedist representing the maximum range
of fire of the military units and set it to 8, i.e., I(firedist) = 8. We can express
the fact that the units z and z′ are within fire range by the following formula:
FDist(z, z′) ::= dist(z, z′) < firedist
The following expression specifies that in the present QIS every agent has at
least one unit which is not within the fire range of any other enemy unit:
(Pσ, s) |= ∃iz∀jz
′¬FDist(z, z′), for j 6= i
Now suppose that hostilities break out in our scenario and agent 3 somehow
acquires the knowledge that one of agent 1’s military units is at (2,2). The
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resulting state s′ differs from s only for the local state of agent 3:
l3(s
′) = 〈〈(2, 2)〉, 〈〉, 〈(1,−3,−3), (2,−3,−6), (3,−6,−3), (4,−6,−8), (5,−8,−5)〉, 〈〉〉
As a consequence, agent 3 acquires de dicto knowledge that the first of his
units is within the range of enemy fire, even if she does not know this fact
de re, that is, she does not know which of agent 1’s units actually threathens
agent 3’s first unit.
(P, s′) |= ∃3zK3∃1z
′FDist(z, z′) but (P, s′) 6|= ∃3z∃1z
′K3FDist(z, z
′)
This is because the following local states for agent 1 is consistent with agent
3’s local state in s′, i.e., there is a state s′′′′ such that l3(s
′′′′) = l3(s
′) and
l1(s
′′′′) = 〈〈(2, 2, 2), (1, 6, 5), (3, 2, 7), (4, 4, 12), (5, 7, 9)〉, 〈〉, 〈〉, 〈〉〉
Now suppose that agent 1 discovers unit mu3.1’s position. The change in his
local state is recorded in the global state s′′ differing from s′ as to l1:
l1(s
′′) = 〈〈(1, 2, 2), (2, 6, 5), (3, 2, 7), (4, 4, 12), (5, 7, 9)〉, 〈〉, 〈(1,−3,−3)〉, 〈〉〉
Then, agent 1 too knows that one of his units is within the range of enemy
fire. In particular, she has de re knowledge of this fact, i.e., she knows the
identity of agent 3’s unit:
(P, s′′) |= ∃1zK1∃3z
′FDist(z, z′) and also (P, s′′) |= ∃1z∃3z
′K1FDist(z, z
′)
Given that one of agent i’s units is within the range of enemy fire, agent i is in
a dangerous situation. For expressing this, we introduce a predicate Danger,
whose meaning is left underspecified through a caeteris paribus clause θ. We
assume that our QIS validates the following de dicto specification on Danger:
∀iz(Ki∃jz
′FDist(z, z′) ∧ θ ↔ Danger(z)), for j 6= i
The specification above is weaker than the following de re formula for speci-
fying the Danger′ predicate on danger:
∀iz(∃jz
′KiFDist(z, z
′) ∧ θ ↔ Danger′(z)), for j 6= i
In fact, the notion of Danger′ implies that of Danger, and agent 1 knows herself
to be both in Danger and in Danger ′, while agent 3 only knows herself to be
in Danger :
(P, s′′) |= ∃1zK1Danger(z) and (P, s
′′) |= ∃1zK1Danger
′(z)
(P, s′′) |= ∃3zK3Danger(z) but (P, s
′′) 6|= ∃3zK3Danger
′(z)
Agents can try to find a way out of this situation either by attacking or by
withdrawing. In order to analyse these alternatives, we introduce a knowl-
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edge based protocol [17]. First of all, we define a predicate Access such that
Access((x, y)(x′, y′)) iff |x − x′| ≤ 1 and |y − y′| ≤ 1. Intuitively, the set
{p′ | Access(p, p′)} contains the points recheable from p in a single move.
Moreover, we consider two actions: ATTACK and MOVE. The protocol for
agent i 6= j can be written in pseudo-code as follows:
if KiDanger(z) then
if ∃ix(Access(z, x) ∧ ∀jz
′Ki(¬FDist(x, z
′))) then
MOVE(z,x)
else if ∃jz
′KiFDist(z, z
′) then
ATTACK(z’)
This protocol says that if agent i knows that a unit z is in danger, then she
has to move it to an area known to be out of the enemy fire range. If this is
not possible, then she has to attack the enemy unit threatening her own unit.
Note that this protocol is extremely strict, as it requires knowledge of safety
conditions before moving. In the present case, we have:
(P, s′′) |= ∃1z(K1Danger(z) ∧ ∀1x(Access(z, x)→ K1∃3z
′FDist(x, z′))∧
∧ ∃3z
′K1FDist(z, z
′))
Therefore agent 1, by following the knowledge-based protocol above, will at-
tack the first unit of agent 3.
By suitably extending our language, we could express interesting topological
relationships on the various Di, like the presence of obstacles. Moreover, we
could introduce intensional predicates to describe in detail the characteristics
of the military units. The system above is simply an example, but we deem
it persuading enough to let us conclude that QIS are sufficiently expressive to
represent a number of concrete MAS scenarios.
5.2 Infinitely many muddy children
In this subsection we use the language Lobjn to present an infinite version of
the muddy children puzzle [17], a well-known scenario in epistemic logic. We
observe that the solution to this puzzle depends only on the number k of
muddy children, not on the total number m ≥ k of children. In other words,
at the end of the k-th round every child knows whether his forehead is muddy
or not, independently from the total number m of children.
This remark suggests that there is no need to fix in advance the size of the
set D of children in the muddy children puzzle. Given this, we take D as
containing an infinite number of children and we introduce an infinite version
of this puzzle.
However, the language Lobjn in Section 3.1 contains only a finite number n
of epistemic operators, so in the present formalism we can reason about the
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knowledge of just a finite subset ofD. This is a limitation of the present setting,
which can be overcome by introducing a language with infinite denumerable
epistemic operators. Such an extension is beyond our interest in this paper,
so we leave it for further work.
We take the local state li of child i ≤ n to be either 1 or 0 depending on
whether his forehead is muddy or not, while the local state of the environment
remains unspecified as it does not influence the present analysis. So we take it
to be the empty sequence. We define a muddy children quantified interpreted
system as follows:
Definition 58 A muddy children QIS, or MCQIS, is any pair 〈S,D〉, where
S ⊆ Le × L1 × . . .× Ln, and D is an infinite set of children.
Note that we have a single quantification domain D for all children, this im-
plies that we can omit the subscript i from quantifiers, and consider in Lobjn
unique quantifiers ∀, ∃ for all agents.
Instead of using, as in the propositional case, propositions pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
representing the fact that “child i’s forehead is muddy”, we use a unary pred-
icative constant M and infinitely many constants such that M(ai) intuitively
means that “child i’s forehead is muddy”. Hereafter we present our analysis
of this infinite version of the muddy children puzzle.
After the father’s announcement that at least one child has a muddy fore-
head, the children have common knowledge of this fact. The language Lobjn
has no common knowledge operator: we approximate this by assuming that
Ki1 . . . Kij∃xM(x) holds at step 1, for every i1, . . . , ij ≤ n. This formula does
not hold in every muddy children QIS, but it is valid on the MCQIS where S
does not contain the global state with only 0s.
Further, every child knows whether any other child is muddy or not, and this
can be expressed in Lobjn as the following specification:
∀x(x 6= ajk → (Kj1 . . .KjkM(x) ∨Kj1 . . .Kjk¬M(x))) (18)
but he does not know whether he is muddy or not, that is, also the following
specification holds at the beginning:
¬KjM(aj) ∧ ¬Kj¬M(aj) (19)
By induction on the number k of muddy children, it is provable that at the
k-th round of answers every child knows whether his forehead is muddy or
not. Moreover, this result is independent from the actual number of children,
and it holds also for an infinite number of children. In what follows we refer
to principles and rules of inference of the system Q.S5objn in Section 4, we do
not provide all the details of proofs, the interested reader should nonetheless
be able to fill the gaps.
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For k = 1, assume that child j knows that (20) at least one child has a muddy
forehead, and that (21) he cannot see any other child with a muddy forehead:
Kj∃xM(x) (20)
Kj∀y(y 6= aj → ¬M(y)) (21)
These formulas hold in the muddy children QIS where at least one and only
one child has a muddy forehead. In the first-order modal system Q.S5objn we
can show that child j deduces that his own forehead is muddy as follows:
a. Kj(∃xM(x) ∧ ∀y(y 6= aj → ¬M(y))) from (20), (21) by modal calculus
b. Kj∃x(M(x) ∧ (x 6= aj → ¬M(x))) from a by predicate calculus
c. Kj∃x(M(x) ∧ x = aj) from b by propositional calculus
So child j acquires the knowledge that his own forehead is muddy, i.e.,KjM(aj)
holds, and he will answer positively in the first round when asked.
For k = 2, after the first round of negatively answered questions, every child
i knows that there are at least two children with muddy foreheads. We can
represent this situation by means of the following de dicto formula:
Ki∃x, y(x 6= y ∧M(x) ∧M(y)) (22)
Note that if child i has not a muddy forehead, it is trivial to check that (22)
holds, as child i can see two other children with muddy foreheads. On the
other hand, if child i is one of the muddy children, then he can derive (22) in
Q.S5objn from the principles (20), (21), (c) above.
In order to see this, assume that j is the muddy child other than i, who has
negatively answered the first question. This means that (c) KjM(aj) fails, so
either (20) or (21) does not hold. But it is the case that (20) Kj∃xM(x), so
¬Kj∀y(y 6= aj → ¬M(y)), that is, (21) is not valid.
Further, we can show that if child j does not know that he is the only muddy
child, then there is some other child, who is known to be muddy by j:
¬Kj∀y(y 6= aj → ¬M(y))→ ∃y(y 6= aj ∧KjM(y)) (23)
In fact, formula (23) can be proved in the system Q.S5objn as follows
1 :
a. ¬Kj∀y(y 6= aj → ¬M(y)) by assumption
b. ¬∀y(y 6= aj → Kj¬M(y)) from a by (see footnote)
c. ∃y(y 6= aj ∧ ¬Kj¬M(y)) from b by predicate calculus
d. ∃y(y 6= aj ∧KjM(y)) from c by (18)
1 Note that (t 6= t′ → Kjφ) → Kj(t 6= t
′ → φ) is a validity in all muddy children
QIS, because of the interpretation of terms.
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As a result, (23) holds in the muddy children QIS. Therefore, by (23) and the
negation of (21) we derive ∃y(y 6= aj ∧ KjM(y)). Finally, by axioms T and
Nec the muddy child i acquires the knowledge that there is a muddy child
different from j, i.e., Ki∃y(y 6= aj∧M(y)). We also assumed that i knows that
j has a muddy forehead, KiM(aj), so we can easily derive (22) in Q.S5
obj
n by
first-order calculus.
Up to now we showed that after the first round of questions every child, muddy
or not, knows that there are at least two muddy children. Now, suppose that
child j can see only another child z with a muddy forehead. This situation
validates the following de re specification, i.e., child j knows that every child
other than him and z is clean:
∃zKj∀k(k 6= aj ∧ k 6= z → ¬M(k)) (24)
We can show that from the de dicto knowledge of the existence of two muddy
children expressed in (22), and formula (24) above, in Q.S5objn child j deduces
the de re knowledge that he is the other muddy child as follows:
a. Kj∃x, y (x 6= y ∧M(x) ∧M(y))∧
∧∃zKj∀k (k 6= aj ∧ k 6= z → ¬M(k)) from (22), (24)
b. ∃zKj∃x, y (x 6= y ∧M(x) ∧M(y)∧
∧∀k(k 6= aj ∧ k 6= z → ¬M(k))) from a by predicate calculus
c. ∃zKj∃x, y (x 6= y ∧M(x) ∧M(y)∧
∧(x = aj ∨ x = z) ∧ (y = aj ∨ y = z)) from b by Ex
d. ∃zKj∃x, y (x 6= y ∧M(x) ∧M(y)∧
∧((x = aj ∧ y = z) ∨ (y = aj ∧ x = z))) from c by distributivity
e. ∃zKj (aj 6= z ∧M(aj) ∧M(z)) from d by predicate calculus
As a result, child j acquires de re knowledge that he is the other muddy child
and replies positively on the second round of questions.
It is an easy induction step to show that if there are k muddy children, then
there are formal proofs in the system Q.S5objn that they will know within the
k-th round whether their foreheads are muddy. Since we are reasoning about
an infinite set D of children, none of the formulas above can be translated into
the propositional language of [17] for example. Given the above, the infinite
version of the muddy children puzzle has a natural and intelligible formal proof
in first-order epistemic logic
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6 Message-Passing QIS
This section is devoted to modeling message-passing systems (MPS) [17,54] in
the framework of objectual QIS. An MPS is a multi-agent system where agents
communicate by exchanging messages, so the most relevant actions performed
by agents are the sending and receiving of messages. The formalism of mes-
sage passing systems is useful to model a wide range of multi-agent systems.
For instance, a network of computers, such as the Internet, can be seen as
an MPS. In general, any multi-agent system is an MPS if the message trans-
mission delay is not negligible. In MPS the local state of each agent contains
information about the initial state, the messages it has sent or received, as
well as the internal actions it has taken. One of the first references dealing
with MPS is [41], since then they have been extensively investigated both in
their synchronous and asynchronous formulations [17,54].
In what follows we show that MPS can be defined as a particular class of ob-
jectual SGS satisfying a finite number of specifications in the first-order modal
language LDn , where n is the number of agents in the MPS. Our main result
consists in showing that Proposition 4.4.3 in [17], concerning the knowledge
of the ordering of events in MPS, can be restated as a validity on the class of
QIS modeling MPS. Thus, the formalism of objectual QIS is powerful enough
to deal with the theory of message passing systems. Throughout this section
we refer to [17], par. 4.4.5-6, for details on MPS.
More formally, we introduce a set Act of actions α1, α2, . . ., and a set Msg of
messages µ1, µ2, . . . For each agent i ∈ A, we consider a set Σi of initial events
init(i, α), and a set Inti of internal events int(i, α). We define the local state
li for agent i as a history over Σi, Inti and Msg, that is, a sequence of events
whose first element is in Σi, and whose following elements either belong to
Inti or are events of the form send(i, j, µ), rec(i, j, µ) for j ∈ A, µ ∈ Msg.
Intuitively, init(i, α) represents the event where agent i performs the initial
action α, send(i, j, µ) represents the event where agent i sends message µ to
j, while the intended meaning of rec(i, j, µ) is that agent i receives message µ
from j. Finally, int(i, α) means that agent i performs the internal action α.
A global state s is a tuple 〈le, l1, . . . , ln〉, where l1, . . . , ln are local states as
above and le contains all the events in l1, . . . , ln.
We define a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation ≤ on the set of
local states of any agent i such that li ≤ l
′
i iff li is a prefix of l
′
i. This order
extends to global states, so that s ≤ s′ iff li ≤ l
′
i for every i ∈ A.
We define message passing QIS (MPQIS) as objectual quantified interpreted
systems P = 〈S,D, I〉 where S is a non-empty set of global states, the domain
D of individuals includes all agents in A, the messages in Msg, the actions in
Act, the events e1, e2, . . ., and I is an interpretation for language L
D
n .
Intuitively, each MPQIS models the temporal evolution of a message pass-
ing system, which can be represented as a sequence s0, s1, . . . of global states
such that s0 = 〈init(e, αe), init(1, α1), . . . , init(n, αn)〉, and for every n ∈ N,
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either sn+1 is identical to sn or there is i ∈ A such that li(sn) ≤ li(sn+1)
but li(sn) 6= li(sn+1). Note that a single MPQIS can model several temporal
evolutions of the same MPS.
We assume that our language has terms and predicative letters for represent-
ing the objects in the domain D and the relations among them. In particular,
e1, e2, . . . are metaterms ranging over events: for instance, we introduce ∀eφ[e]
as a shorthand for
∀i, j, µ, α φ[send(i, j, µ)] ∧ φ[rec(i, j, µ)] ∧ φ[init(i, α)] ∧ φ[int(i, α)]
In fact, every event is either a send event, a receive event, an initial action,
or an internal action. We use the same notation for the objects in the model
and the syntactic elements, the distinction will be made clear by the context.
We observe that we can express event specifications by using formulas in LDn ,
which are provably valid on every MPQIS (the existence of a unique individual
∃! can be defined by means of =). For example, we can state:
∀e∃!i, j, µ, α (i 6= j) ∧ (e = send(i, j, µ) ∨ e = rec(i, j, µ) ∨ e = init(i, α) ∨ e = int(i, α))
∀i, j, µ, α ∃!e1, e2, e3, e4(send(i, j, µ) = e1 ∧ rec(i, j, µ) = e2 ∧ init(i, α) = e3∧
∧int(i, α) = e4 ∧ e1 6= e2 ∧ e1 6= e3 ∧ e1 6= e4 ∧ e2 6= e3 ∧ e2 6= e4 ∧ e3 6= e4)
The first specification expresses the fact that every event is either a send event
or a receive event, where the sender is different from the receiver, an initial ac-
tion, or an internal action. Thus, it cannot be the case that e = send(i, j, µ) =
send(i′, j′, µ′) for distinct agents and messages. The second specification states
that every send or receive event, initial action, and internal action are distinct
events. Thus, we cannot have send(i, j, µ) = e = rec(i′, j′, µ′). It is easy to
check that our definition of MPQIS validates both specifications.
In [17], p. 132 the authors list three key constraints on MPS, the third one
involves the notion of run on a SGS, i.e., a temporal evolution of global states.
Nonetheless, we can restate the first two without introducing runs:
MP1 a local state li for agent i is a history over Σi, Inti and Msg;
MP2 for every event rec(i, j, µ) in li(s) there exists an event send(j, i, µ) in lj(s).
Further, the following simplifying assumption is considered:
* all events in a given agent’s local state are distinct, an agent can never
perform the same action twice.
We show how to formalise these specifications in the present formalism. First,
we introduce a predicate H for happened such that (Pσ, s) |= H(e, i) iff e is
an event in the local state li(s) of agent i. The formula H(e) is a shorthand
for ∃iH(e, i). By definition of MPS we can show that (Pσ, s) |= H(e) iff e is
an event in s. Further, we define an order Prec on events as follows:
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(Pσ, s) |= Prec(e, e′, i) iff (Pσ, s) |= H(e, i) ∧H(e′, i) and
for all s′ ≤ s, (Pσ, s′) |= H(e′, i)→ H(e, i).
The definition of Prec(e, e′) can be obtained from the one above by disregard-
ing the i component:
(Pσ, s) |= Prec(e, e′) iff (Pσ, s) |= H(e) ∧H(e′) and
for all s′ ≤ s, (Pσ, s′) |= H(e′)→ H(e).
We can insist on the events in a global state s to be partially ordered by
specifying that Prec(e, e′) is a reflexive and transitive relation on the set of
past events:
H(e)→ Prec(e, e) (25)
Prec(e, e′) ∧ Prec(e′, e′′)→ Prec(e, e′′) (26)
Moreover, Prec(e, e′, i) can be defined as a linear order on the events in li, i.e.,
it is also anti-symmetric and total:
Prec(e, e′, i) ∧ Prec(e′, e, i)→ (e = e′) (27)
H(e, i) ∧H(e′, i)→ Prec(e, e′, i) ∨ Prec(e′, e, i) (28)
We define Linear(Prec(e, e′, i)) as the conjunction of (25)–(28) above, express-
ing the fact that the relation Prec(e, e′, i) is linear. Also, we define the first
event as the minimal one with respect to Prec(e, e′, i), that is,
Fst(e, i) ::=∀e′(H(e′, i)→ Prec(e, e′, i))
Finally, the formulas Sent(i, j, µ), Recd(i, j, µ), Init(i, α), and Int(i, α) are
shorthands for H(send(i, j, µ)), H(rec(i, j, µ)), H(init(i, α)), and H(int(i, α))
respectively. We can now formalise the specifications MP1-2 and * as follows:
MP1* Linear(Prec(e, e′, i)) ∧ ∃!e(Fst(e, i) ∧ ∃α(e = init(i, α)))∧
∧∀e(¬Fst(e, i)→ ∃j, α, µ(e = int(i, α) ∨ e = send(i, j, µ) ∨ e = rec(i, j, µ)))
MP2’ ∀i, j, µ(Recd(i, j, µ)→ Sent(j, i, µ))
The validity of MP1* on MPQIS forces the local state of any agent i to satisfy
specifications MP1 and *; while by MP2’ specification MP2 is satisfied.
Formulas MP1* and MP2’ are the basic specifications for MPQIS, but we can
consider further key constraints on message passing system. A property often
required in the framework of MPS is channel reliability. Modified from [17], an
MPS is reliable if every sent message is eventually received, or more formally:
MP4 if send(i, j, µ) is in li(s), then there exists a global state s
′ such that rec(j, i, µ)
is in lj(s
′).
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In the language LDn we can formalise this specification as follows:
MP4’ ∀j, µ(Sent(i, j, µ)→ ¬Ki¬Recd(j, i, µ))
In fact, if send(i, j, µ) is in li(s), by M4’ (P
σ, s) |= ¬Ki¬Recd(j, i, µ), this
means that there exists a global state s′ such that (Pσ, s′) |= Recd(j, i, µ),
that is, rec(j, i, µ) ∈ lj(s
′). Thus, MP4 holds. Note that MP4’ is actually
stronger than MP4 as the former requires that the local states of agent i in s
and s′ are identical.
Further, a relevant property of MPS concerns authentication: if agent i receives
a message µ from agent j, then i knows that µ was actually sent by j. This
specification can be expressed as
∀j, µ(Recd(i, j, µ)→ KiSent(j, i, µ))
Finally, we may require that agents have perfect recall, i.e., to know everything
that has happened to them:
∀e(H(e, i)→ KiH(e, i))
It is easy to show that MPQIS satisfy authentication and perfect recall but not
channel reliability. Of course, we could add this formula in any specification
should channel reliability be required. We remark that all the specifications
introduced so far are defined by means of only the predicative constantsH(e, i)
and Prec(e, e′, i).
We now prove the main result of this section: Proposition 4.4.3 in [17] can be
restated as a validity on the class of MPQIS satisfying MP1, MP2, and *. We
do not provide the full statement here, but we note that this metatheoretical
result can be cast as a formula in the first-order epistemic language LDn . First,
we introduce a relation 7→G of potential causality between events, as discussed
in [41,54]. This relation is intended to capture the intuition that event e might
have caused event e′. Fix a non-empty subset G of A, the relation 7→G holds
between events e, e′ at a state s iff both e and e′ appear in s, and
(1) for some i, j ∈ G, e′ is a receive event and e is the corresponding send
event;
(2) for some i ∈ G, events e, e′ are both in li(s), and either e = e
′, or e comes
earlier than e′ in li(s);
(3) for some event e′′, we have that e 7→G e
′′ and e′′ 7→G e
′ hold at s.
Note that 7→G is a partial order on events. We say that (P
σ, s) |= e 7→G e
′ if
e 7→G e
′ hold at s (we use the same notation for syntax and semantics).
Now we prove that the potential causality relation 7→G respects the order Prec
of events by showing that the following validity holds in the class of MPQIS.
This means that if event e is the cause of event e′, then it is distributed
knowledge among the agents that e happened before e′. Note that this is the
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right to left implication of Proposition 4.4.3 in [17]:
Proposition 59 MPQIS |= ∀e, e′((e 7→G e
′)→ DGPrec(e, e
′))
Proof. Assume that (Pσ, s) |= e 7→G e
′. If e′ is a receive event and e is the
corresponding send event, then li(s) = li(s
′) for all i ∈ G implies (Pσ, s′) |=
H(e)∧H(e′), and for s′′ ≤ s′, (Pσ, s′′) |= Recd(i, j, µ)→ Sent(j, i, µ) by MP2’.
Thus, (Pσ, s) |= DGPrec(e, e
′).
If e, e′ are both in li(s) and either e = e
′ or e comes earlier than e′ in li(s),
then li(s) = li(s
′) implies that (Pσ, s′) |= H(e) ∧ H(e′), and for s′′ ≤ s′,
(Pσ, s′′) |= H(e′) → H(e). It follows that (Pσ, s) |= KiPrec(e, e
′), and by
axioms D1 and D2, (Pσ, s) |= DGPrec(e, e
′).
Finally, if there exists some event e′′ such that e 7→G e
′′ and e′′ 7→G e
′, then we
can assume without loss of generality that we are either in the first or second
case above. In both cases (Pσ, s) |= DGPrec(e, e
′′)∧DGPrec(e
′′, e′). Therefore,
for every s′, li(s) = li(s
′) for all i ∈ G implies (Pσ, s′) |= H(e) ∧ H(e′), and
for s′′ ≤ s′, (Pσ, s′′) |= H(e′′) → H(e) ∧ H(e′) → H(e′′). By transitivity,
(Pσ, s′′) |= H(e′)→ H(e). Thus, (Pσ, s) |= DGPrec(e, e
′). 2
The analysis of message-passing systems carried out in this section shows
the advantages in terms of expressivity of first-order epistemic formalisms in
comparison with propositional ones. By means of language LDn we are able
to formalise various constraints on MPS, thereby validating the suitability of
the approach. Most importantly, an encoding of the right to left implication
of Proposition 4.4.3 in [17] can be shown to be a validity on the class of QIS
modeling MPS.
7 Conclusions
First-order epistemic logic allows for greater expressiveness in comparison to
propositional formalisms. In specific applications this advantage can be criti-
cal for modeling agent systems in a more intuitive and effective way. Because
of this, FOEL has successfully been applied to reasoning about knowledge in
artificial intelligence [42,53,45]. However, the literature on this subject in the
MAS area have so far fallen short of a deep and systematic analysis of the
formal machinery (axiomatisability, decidability, completeness), even in the
case of static epistemic logic.
In this paper we showed that the semantics of interpreted systems may natu-
rally be extended to first-order, and we provided complete axiomatisations for
several classes of structures, which is noteworthy given the known difficulties
of these formalisms [22,59]. Specifically, we considered different assumptions
on quantification domains, their relationship with the agents’ local states, and
the impact these assumptions make in terms of axiomatisations. We exempli-
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fied the use of these formalisms by investigating two examples. The puzzle of
muddy children in Section 5 is part of the folklore of multi-agent systems in AI
[17]; while the formalisation of the battlefield game as a quantified interpreted
system is an original example of the expressive features of the present seman-
tical framework. As regards message passing systems, the topic of Section 6,
they have been extensively investigated in computer science both in their syn-
chronous and asynchronous version. In [41] the relation 7→G between events
is introduced, and in [54] it is used to defined a notion of common knowledge
which is attainable also in asynchronous message passing systems. In Section 6
we followed [17] in the presentation of MPS, and proved that Proposition 4.4.3
can be cast as a validity on the class of MPQIS. This reassures us that the
analysis is adequate.
We see this paper as a first contribution in the development of computation-
ally grounded semantics for quantified epistemic logics. Indeed, extensions of
the present framework seem worth pursuing. It may be of interest to explore
the completeness issues resulting from term-indexing epistemic operators, as
in [46]. This would greatly increase the expressive power of the formalism,
so some limitation on index quantification might be introduced to retain a
reasonable computational complexity. Another significant extension would be
to add temporal operators to the language. This would open the way for ax-
iomatisations of first-order temporal epistemic logics for MAS. However, any
work in this area is likely to be affected by technical problems, especially with
respect to axiomatisation and decidability [28,64].
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